University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2022

Anonymous Companies
William J. Moon

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the
Privacy Law Commons

MOON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

3/17/2022 2:32 PM

Duke Law Journal
VOLUME 71

APRIL 2022

NUMBER 7

ANONYMOUS COMPANIES
WILLIAM J. MOON†
ABSTRACT
Hardly a day goes by without hearing about nefarious activities
facilitated by anonymous “shell” companies. Often described as
menaces to the financial system, the creation of business entities with
no real operations in sun-drenched offshore jurisdictions offering
“zero percent” tax rates remains in vogue among business titans, pop
stars, multimillionaires, and royals. The trending headlines and
academic accounts, however, have paid insufficient attention to the
legal uses of anonymous companies that are both ubiquitous and
almost infinite in their variations.
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This Article identifies privacy as a functional feature of modern
business entities by documenting the hidden virtues of anonymous
companies—business enterprises with owners who are practically
untraceable to the general public. Anonymous companies were
essential to launch the first abortion drug in the United States at a time
when no pharmaceutical company was willing to touch it for fear of
backlash by anti-abortion activists. Anonymous companies today serve
as “race-neutral” public faces of Black entrepreneurs who conceal their
race in order to more equitably compete in a marketplace infected with
systemic racism. And anonymous companies are ubiquitous over the
internet, enabling survivors of intimate partner violence to become
financially self-sufficient entrepreneurs without fear of harassment or
stalking.
This Article thus reveals privacy as a prevalent, yet under-theorized
function served by modern business entities. In documenting their use
in today’s commercial life, this Article makes two contributions to the
literature. First, it disrupts prevailing accounts concerning the function
of business entities, departing from scholarly accounts that
predominantly conceptualize business entities as transactional costreducing devices that facilitate the pooling of capital for business
ventures. This Article enriches these accounts by showing how
protecting the identity of capital contributors from forced public
disclosure—what it refers to as identity shielding—can advance
important economic and humanistic interests. While the doctrine of
limited liability encourages entrepreneurial risk-taking by limiting the
amount of capital risk borne by the firm’s equity owners, identity
shielding encourages the flow of capital to business enterprises by
preserving the business owner’s ability to control knowledge about
oneself to the world. Second, it develops a policy framework that
enables a more nuanced discussion balancing the interest in
ameliorating the harm inflicted by anonymity, as well as harnessing the
promise of identity shielding in promoting entrepreneurial risk-taking
and human collaboration.
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INTRODUCTION
In the sleepy, rural town of Cheyenne, Wyoming, lies an
unassuming building that is the juridical home to over two thousand
companies.1 Littered with hundreds of mailboxes, the building serves
as a “virtual office” to thousands of individuals who claim the building
as their business headquarters.2 Some of these companies are mom and
pop businesses operating as limited liability companies (“LLCs”) to
limit the potential personal liability that may accrue to the
hardworking entrepreneurs.3 Others are deployed by some of the
world’s notorious kleptocrats and financial criminals,4 who use
business entities to anonymize a garden variety of modern financial
transactions. The building in Wyoming is one of the dozens of hotspots

1. See Kelly Carr & Brian Grow, Special Report: A Little House of Secrets on the Great
Plains, REUTERS (June 28, 2011, 6:40 AM), http://reut.rs/j6muzU [https://perma.cc/78ZR-TDFE]
(describing a “1,700-square-foot brick house with a manicured lawn” that is said to be the
headquarters of Wyoming Corporate Services, a business-incorporation specialist firm that
houses over two thousand companies).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. See id.; CASEY MICHEL, HUDSON INST., THE UNITED STATES OF ANONYMITY 26
(2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/media.hudson.org/files/publications/UnitedStatesofAnonymity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7AQ-DFSL].
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across the United States that mass produce companies on demand to
cloak financial transactions for anyone willing to pay a modest fee.5
These mailboxes are the physical sites of how modern corporate
law has engineered vehicles designed to anonymize the source of
capital injected into business enterprises. In its simplest iteration,
secrecy is accomplished by operating a business in the name of the
corporate entity formed in a jurisdiction, like Wyoming, that does not
require the actual owners of business entities to be disclosed.6
Nefarious activities facilitated by these anonymous “shell”
companies—including drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism
financing, and tax evasion—by now are familiar to avid readers of The
New York Times and The Washington Post.7
But the use of anonymous companies is not limited to those who
engage in illicit activities. They constitute an important lifeblood of
modern commercial life—judging by their explosive popularity in the
United States.8 Anonymous companies today serve as “race-neutral”
public faces of Black business owners who conceal their race to more
equitably compete in a marketplace full of systemic racism.9 They are
ubiquitous over the internet, ranging from small e-commerce
entrepreneurs selling on eBay and Amazon to incognito owners of

5. See MICHAEL G. FINDLEY, DANIEL L. NIELSON & J.C. SHARMAN, GLOBAL SHELL
GAMES: EXPERIMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS, CRIME, AND TERRORISM 11 (2014).
6. See id. at 9.
7. See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Tax Cheats Deprive Governments Worldwide of $427 Billion a
Year, Crippling Pandemic Response: Study, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2020, 7:01 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-policy/2020/11/19/global-tax-evasion-data [https://perma.cc/
KB54-VPNA]; Peter J. Henning, Is This the End of Anonymous Shell Companies? Not Too Fast,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/
dealbook/llc-shell-companies-money-laundering.html [https://perma.cc/Y89U-W9BV].
8. One law firm partner specializing in producing anonymous companies maintains: “Our
own firm has experienced year-over-year sales for Anonymous LLC’s, which are growing by triple
digits.” Merilee Kern, Anonymous L.L.C. Demand Accelerates as Business Owners Pursue Privacy
Protection in the Information Age, BLACK ENTER. (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.blackenterprise.com/
anonymous-l-l-c-demand-accelerates-as-business-owners-pursue-privacy-protection-in-the-informationage [https://perma.cc/8VDH-UBS6] (quoting Larry Donahue).
9. See infra Section II.B. I capitalize the word “Black” throughout this Article for the
reasons articulated by Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’
constitute a specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”).
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some of the world’s most highly trafficked pornographic websites.10 As
one law firm partner specializing in forming anonymous companies
explains, “The types of owners are diverse and include everything from
businesses you see when you drive down the street to . . . those who sell
goods online through e-commerce platforms and do not want their
names and home addresses published with their seller information.”11
Today, business entities are deployed not only to efficiently pool
capital for business ventures but also to serve as powerful secrecy
cloaks designed to conceal the ownership structure of business
enterprises. For the past several decades, corporate law luminaries
have principally focused on the former, making significant inroads
augmenting our understanding of the “essential” role of business
entities.12 According to the standard account, the corporate form is a
legal privilege invented in the name of efficiency to reduce the
transactional costs associated with pooling capital for business
enterprises.13 It provides an efficient way—some would argue the only

10. See, e.g., Patricia Nilsson, MindGeek: The Secretive Owner of Pornhub and RedTube,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/b50dc0a4-54a3-4ef6-88e0-3187511a67a2
[https://perma.cc/5LW8-U7DH].
11. Kern, supra note 8 (quoting Larry Donahue).
12. See id.; Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the
Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1336–37 (2006) [hereinafter Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, Law
and the Rise]; Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 391 (2003) [hereinafter Blair,
Locking]; Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as Asset Partitioning, 44
EUR. ECON. REV. 807, 813–14 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role
of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman,
Essential Role].
13. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 398, 430. As Justice Leo
Strine and Professor Jonathan Macey put it, “the treatment of corporations as separate legal
entities is . . . what justifies the legal notion of ‘limited liability’ and other central characteristics
of the corporate form, such as the ability to contract and to sue and be sued.” Jonathan Macey &
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 451, 455. In a strict
sense, the term “corporate form” is commonly used to refer to corporations, as opposed to other
types of business entities. I use the term loosely in this Article to refer to business entities that are
chartered by a sovereign government, with recognition of separate legal personality and
functional features on creditor rights and limited liability associated with traditional corporations.
Thus, my terminology includes the limited liability company (“LLC”), the limited liability
partnership (“LLP”), the limited liability limited partnership (“LLLP”), and the statutory
business trust. This usage is consistent with the following description from Professors Henry
Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire:
The many legal forms for business organizations that first appeared during the last
thirty years . . . all combine the pattern of creditors’ rights . . . that are traditional to the
business corporation with the freedom of contract among investors and managers that
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practical way—to achieve the so-called asset partitioning critical for
modern business enterprises.14 Asset partitioning, which relies on the
idea that corporations are separate legal persons from natural persons
who own and control those entities,15 serves two related functions:
entity shielding, which ensures that personal creditors of the owners
cannot opportunistically withdraw capital from the firm, thereby
enabling capital to be “locked in” for the enterprise,16 and limited
liability, which incentivizes entrepreneurial risk-taking by ensuring
that owners do not risk more than their capital investment.17 These
business enterprises are in turn understood to be foundational to the
modern economy.18
This Article builds on this literature, documenting an
underexamined collateral feature of business entities. Namely, modern
business entities are widely used today as powerful privacy devices that
protect the identity of capital contributors from forced public
disclosure.19 It refers to this feature—the ability of individuals to invest
is traditional to the partnership. . . . The new forms are thus better understood as part
of the continuing development of the corporate form . . . .
Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities in
Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 6 [hereinafter Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire,
New Business].
14. As Professors Hansmann and Kraakman explain in their groundbreaking piece, while
contract law can create core characteristics that can functionally emulate the legal structure
created by business entities, “the transaction costs necessary to accomplish this would be
prohibitive.” Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 406. The doctrine of
limited liability, enjoyed as a birthright of modern corporations, “has been credited with making
it easier to raise capital and, by extension, contributing to the tremendous economic growth that
occurred during the twentieth century.” Joshua C. Macey, What Corporate Veil?, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 1195, 1204–05 (2019).
15. See ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 35 (2013). The
legal personality attached to the corporate form—perhaps most clearly espoused through
“corporations are people too” slogans—is the doctrinal metaphor that enables firms to exercise
certain business capabilities, including the ability to contract, own property, sue, and be sued in
the corporate name. See Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L.
REV. 1629, 1638 [hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving].
16. See Blair, Locking, supra note 12.
17. See Pollman, Reconceiving, supra note 15, at 1634.
18. See Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Oscar Gelderblom, Joost Jonker & Enrico C. Perotti, The
Emergence of the Corporate Form, 33 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 193, 225 (2017) (“The corporate form
is now the foundation of the modern market economy. Its benefits are well appreciated:
permanent capital grants an autonomous and indefinite life, and a capacity for long-term
investment.”).
19. Privacy is a loaded and contested term. The focus of this Article concerns anonymity, or
a condition in which business enterprises associated with a person are largely unidentified to the
general publicpublic. See Jeffrey M. Skopek, Reasonable Expectations of Anonymity, 101 VA. L.
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in and operate business enterprises without forced public disclosure—
as identity shielding.
Despite being of central importance to vast swaths of modern
entrepreneurs, the privacy of capital contributors has largely escaped
the radar of legal scholars as a functional feature of the corporate
form.20 Instead, corporate law’s foundational concepts, manifesting in
canonical doctrines like limited liability, are typically discussed in
terms of disagreements about whether and to what extent the law
ought to encourage entrepreneurial risk-taking by limiting the
potential capital loss borne by investors.21 These accounts are largely

REV. 691, 725 (2015) (defining anonymity as “a condition in which something associated with a
person . . . is known only through traits that are not, without further information or investigation,
unique and connected in a way that provides a relevant form of access to that person in a given
context”). While arguably distinct concepts, anonymity can advance various privacy interests. See,
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 876 (1996)
(“Anonymity refers to the power to control whether people know who you are; it is a tool of
privacy.”).
20. Functional inquiries mean different things to different people. In developing a
functional account, this Article attempts to organize discussion around the way in which the law
has responded to the exigencies of commercial activity. See John Armour, Henry Hansmann,
Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate Law, in THE ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 3–4 (Reinier Kraakman
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2017). This line of inquiry benefits from a rich body of literature concerning the
related but distinct questions of whether corporations are legal persons and whether those
juridical entities ought to have the right to privacy as a matter of U.S. constitutional law. For
influential scholarship in this line of work, see ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW
AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS, at xvi (2018); Elizabeth Pollman, A
Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 27–30 (2014) [hereinafter Pollman, Corporate];
Eric W. Orts & Amy Sepinwall, Privacy and Organizational Persons, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2275,
2286–87 (2015); Vincent S.J. Buccola, Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality, 101 IOWA
L. REV. 499, 502–05 (2016). These accounts principally concern whether certain categories of
constitutional rights enjoyed by natural persons ought to be extended to corporations—a related
but separate inquiry from whether identity shielding should be a functional feature offered by
modern business entities. Chief among the differences is that a functional account can uncover a
range of interests that are important policy considerations but outside the scope of a conventional
constitutional analysis. This Article engages with this literature further in Section III.B.
21. Compare Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder
Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, Toward Unlimited] (“We argue, contrary to the prevailing view, that limited liability
in tort cannot be rationalized for either closely-held or publicly-traded corporations on the
strength of the conventional arguments offered on its behalf.”), and Hansmann & Kraakman,
Essential Role, supra note 12 (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in effect, the
reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the assets of the entity from claims of the
creditors of the entity’s owners or managers.”), with STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE & M. TODD
HENDERSON, LIMITED LIABILITY: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 13 (2016) (“Although
some leading scholars claim that entity shielding rather than limited liability . . . is the essential
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agnostic to the privacy interests of capital contributors involved in
business ventures and implicitly conceptualize liability in terms of the
loss of capital accrued to entrepreneurs in the event of business
failure.22 In reality, privacy matters a great deal when it comes to the
propensity of individuals to take on business risks. In this sense,
identity shielding can be understood as providing limited reputational
liability rather than limited capital liability to business owners.
Of course, identity shielding is far from a universally desired
feature associated with business entities. One only needs to browse
local restaurants and bars to know that business owners often
broadcast their ownership status. Consider Louis’ Lunch in New
Haven, Connecticut. Its owner, Jeff Lassen, proudly identifies his
business as family-owned and operated by the fourth generation, in
part to capitalize on his great grandparent Louis Lassen’s fame from
being the first person in the United States to sell the hamburger
sandwich in 1900.23 The widely publicized disclosure of Oprah
Winfrey’s ownership stake in Weight Watchers, which more than
doubled the company’s share price, is another example of how public
knowledge of a source of capital can enhance firm value.24
But for certain business enterprises, identity shielding is arguably
more important than limited liability or entity shielding. Identity
shielding is particularly vital to pool capital for morally contestable
enterprises. For instance, anonymous companies were instrumental in
bringing the first abortion drug to the United States, which no
pharmaceutical company was willing to touch at the time for fear of
backlash by anti-abortion activists.25 To operate the now-infamous
attribute of corporate law, the importance of limited liability to the development and success of
the corporate form should not be minimized.” (footnote omitted)).
22. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89–90 (1985) (“The rule of limited liability means that the
investors in the corporation are not liable for more than the amount they invest. . . . The managers
and the other workers are not vicariously liable for the firm’s deeds. No one risks more than he
invests.”).
23. The History of Louis’ Lunch, LOUIS’ LUNCH, https://louislunch.com/history
[https://perma.cc/429F-RRVD].
24. Rupert Neate, Oprah Winfrey’s Stake in Weight Watchers Sends Share Price Soaring,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 19, 2015, 1:06 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/oct/19/oprahwinfrey-takes-stake-in-weight-watchers [https://perma.cc/E3QK-ZL6N].
25. Sharon Bernstein, Persistence Brought Abortion Pill to U.S., L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2000,
12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2000-nov-05-mn-47330-story.html [https://
perma.cc/X4MM-5SR3] (“[N]ot a single pharmaceutical company stepped up to the plate to help
research, make[,] or manufacture the drug.”).
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Danco Laboratories, investors in the 1990s formed corporate vehicles
in the Cayman Islands so they could remain unidentified by the
public.26 As reported in The Los Angeles Times, “the decision to set up
the investors’ group as an offshore enterprise came about because
participants feared that they would be targeted by abortion opponents,
some of whom ha[d] assaulted and even killed doctors who had
performed abortions.”27
Anonymous companies thus present an opportunity to reimagine
business entities not just as a transactional cost-reducing legal
invention designed to accomplish asset partitioning but also as a
modern privacy device. Like the twin features of entity shielding and
limited liability, identity shielding can also serve socially beneficial
functions by impacting the propensity of individuals to take on
entrepreneurial risk. Today, the doctrine of limited liability is widely
appreciated as a tool to help individuals overcome economic riskaversion, thereby encouraging investment and economic growth.28
Similarly, identity shielding can encourage investment and spur
economic growth by preserving the privacy of capital contributors. In
its strongest form, identity shielding is foundational to the very
existence of many business enterprises that benefit society at large,
including the supply of desirable products and services for consumers.
Identity shielding particularly has a potential to unlock innovation
because it may encourage the flow of capital and human collaboration
for enterprises that may foster critical perspective about the status
quo.29 Anonymity in the financing of business enterprises is also
intimately connected to personal autonomy, such as safeguarding

26. Marcia Riordan, Chemical Abortion in Australia, 15 CHISHOLM HEALTH ETHICS BULL.
6, 7 (2009) (describing Danco as “a company chartered in the Grand Cayman Islands . . . created
to market and distribute RU-486 in the United States” (quoting CHRISTOPHER M. GACEK, FAM.
RSCH. COUNCIL, POLITICIZED SCIENCE: THE MANIPULATED APPROVAL OF RU-486 AND ITS
DANGERS TO WOMEN’S HEALTH 6 (2007), http://downloads.frc.org/EF/EF07A29.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MBG6-DMEG])).
27. Bernstein, supra note 25.
28. See Michael Simkovic, Limited Liability and the Known Unknown, 68 DUKE L.J. 275,
278, 285 (2018).
29. See infra Part II; see also Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1918 (2013) (“[I]nnovation requires the capacity for critical perspective on one’s
environment . . . . Innovation also requires room to tinker, and therefore thrives most fully in an
environment that values and preserves spaces for tinkering.”).
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personal reputations and, in some cases, the physical safety of business
owners.30
But like the doctrine of limited liability, identity shielding does not
come without a charge. By now, legal scholars are acutely familiar with
the cost of limited liability. While credited for incentivizing
entrepreneurial risk-taking that can generate a range of social
benefits,31 limited liability can also create moral hazard problems by
enabling firms to evade involuntary creditors like tort victims.32
Similarly, the cost of identity shielding is far from negligible given
firms’ ability to stream capital to a variety of enterprises that are illicit
or morally unpalatable to mainstream society.33
Thus far, the economic and humanistic interests served by the
corporate form’s privacy function have been underappreciated.
Instead, policy has largely been driven by a zealous campaign to purge
nefarious activities facilitated by anonymous shell companies—entities
with no real operations or assets often deployed for illicit purposes.34
30. See infra Part II.
31. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, Financial Responsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1317 (2007) (“The real policy basis for limited liability . . .
seems to be to promote investment by transferring risk from investors to creditors. Commercial
activity can generate a range of social benefits, including financial returns to investors, jobs for
employees, and desirable products and services for consumers.” (footnote omitted)).
32. As Professors Hansmann and Kraakman explain, “increasing exposure to tort liability
has led to the widespread reorganization of business firms to exploit limited liability to evade
damage claims.” Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited, supra note 21, at 1881. Limited
liability can “create incentives for excessive risk-taking by permitting corporations to avoid the
full costs of their activities.” Id. at 1879.
33. In recent years, LLCs have been used as vehicles for anonymous political campaign
contributions, raising issues about public debate and electoral integrity as well. See Anthony J.
Gaughan, Trump, Twitter, and the Russians: The Growing Obsolescence of Federal Campaign
Finance Law, 27 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 79, 109 (2017) (“Limited liability corporations have also
become a vehicle for donors to avoid disclosure. . . . Only the name of the LLC is reported on
disclosure forms, not the wealthy individuals behind the LLC.”).
34. See infra Section I.A. Not all shell companies are deployed for illicit purposes.
Anonymous companies are frequently used by developers of large-scale projects to prevent the
so-called “holdout” problem that arises when assembling private land from multiple owners.
Amnon Lehavi, Property and Secrecy, 50 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 381, 425–26 (2016).
Anonymous companies enable developers to conceal their true identity to prospective sellers, and
in doing so, reduce the tendency of buyers to “inflate their asking prices and hold out
strategically.” Daniel B. Kelly, Acquiring Land Through Eminent Domain: Justifications,
Limitations, and Alternatives, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY
LAW 344, 357 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds., 2011). The Walt Disney Company was a
pioneer in this practice. The California-based company famously used dozens of subsidiary
entities structured as anonymous companies to purchase large parcels of land in Florida for what
was to become Walt Disney World. See Daniel B. Kelly, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent
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This is an unfortunate intellectual shortcoming. While the desire for
privacy varies significantly across different societies, the explosive
popularity of anonymous companies at the very least demands a
serious academic inquiry into whether there might be socially desirable
interests advanced by identity shielding. Without this basic analysis,
reforms might throw out the proverbial baby with the bathwater.
This project takes on urgent practical importance in light of a
tectonic wave of legislation being enacted across the world that
mandates various levels of disclosure concerning the ownership
structure of business entities. As of the end of 2020, eighty-one
nations around the world now have laws on the books requiring some
form of beneficial ownership information of business entities to be
registered with government authorities—more than double the
number from 2018.35 The United States has joined this movement, with
Congress enacting the Corporate Transparency Act (“CTA”) on
January 1, 2021, which is set to fully take effect in 2023.36 Many voices
are urging the United States to go a step further in adopting an open
access registry giving the public unfettered access to the ownership
structure of private companies.37 Yet, these reform efforts, however
well-intentioned, largely overlook the important economic and
humanistic interests advanced by identity shielding.
To be clear, this Article is not an attempt to denigrate the genuine
and well-intentioned efforts undertaken by various “corporate
transparency” initiatives aimed at curbing financial crimes. It is also

Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 22–23 (2006). Without anonymity, savvy owners would have held out “in hope that Disney
would acquire a sufficiently large number of properties that it would desperately need the
remaining property to facilitate the development.” MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI,
PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW 63–64 (2009).
35. Andres Knobel & Moran Harari, The State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration
in 2020, TAX JUST. NETWORK (June 3, 2020), https://www.taxjustice.net/2020/06/03/the-state-ofplay-of-beneficial-ownership-registration-in-2020 [https://perma.cc/E4RE-Q4S7].
36. Corporate Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6401–6403, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021);
Robert W. Downes, Scott E. Ludwig, Thomas E. Rutledge & Laurie A. Smiley, The Corporate
Transparency Act – Preparing for the Federal Database of Beneficial Ownership Information, AM.
BAR ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY (Apr. 16, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_
law/publications/blt/2021/05/corporate-transparency-act [https://perma.cc/BT7X-NFLU] (“When
fully implemented in 2023, it will create a database of beneficial ownership information within
FinCEN.”).
37. See OPENOWNERSHIP & GLOB. WITNESS, LEARNING THE LESSONS FROM THE UK’S
PUBLIC BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP REGISTER 4 (2017), https://www.openownership.org/uploads/
learning-the-lessons.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QD9-8MJ8].
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not an academic fiat that identity shielding constitutes an essential
feature of the corporate form.38 Any interests served by identity
shielding need not be syllogistically deduced from the premise of
corporate legal personality.39 The concept of juridical persons may
have some metaphysical appeal in conceptualizing the firm as a
creature of legal fiction but does not necessitate bundling privacy rights
with the corporate form from a functional standpoint.
Rather, identity shielding is a policy choice. That policy choice
depends on how any given society prioritizes the contested and
complex relationship between individuals, markets, and governments.
Some of these privacy interests reflect the fundamental values
embedded in constitutional principles and longstanding social norms,
and indeed ones that may be grounded in U.S. constitutional law.40
The remainder of this Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I
synthesizes prevailing accounts of anonymity in business enterprises
and articulates the concept of identity shielding within the broader
literature concerning the function of modern business entities. Part II
provides a typology of individuals that benefit from identity shielding,
by documenting the contemporary uses of anonymous companies
among a diverse array of legal (and arguably socially beneficial)
business ventures. Part III reviews the rapidly developing global trend
toward laws mandating open-access public registries and urges
policymakers to adopt more nuanced approaches—including building
databases only accessible to law enforcement agencies but not the
general public—that may capture some of the benefits of identity

38. Indeed, forming a business entity with formal sovereign recognition is currently not a
prerequisite to run a business in the United States. General partnerships, for instance, do not
require filing with a state and therefore allow owners of enterprises to keep their ownership
information outside of state registries. Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill:
An Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations and LPs Formed in the United
States Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 461 (2010) (“The number of general partnerships formed each year cannot
be tracked since no filing is required.”). But these forms of enterprises suffer from the lack of
limited liability protection offered by entities like the LLC or the corporation. Id.
39. As observed by John Dewey nearly a hundred years ago, a juridical “‘person’ might
legally mean whatever the law makes it mean.” John Dewey, The Historic Background of
Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1926). This line of thought is still widely
accepted by leading scholars and jurists. See Macey & Strine, supra note 13, at 456
(“[C]orporations have only those rights society gives them by statutory law, and any statutory law
may take into account the unique nature of corporations in limiting their ability to act.”).
40. See infra Section III.B.

MOON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/17/2022 2:32 PM

ANONYMOUS COMPANIES

1437

shielding while minimizing the harms inflicted by anonymous shell
companies. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF ANONYMOUS COMPANIES
It may not have been until the massive document leaks known as
the Panama Papers that the general public came to understand the
rampant use of offshore shell companies by the rich and the powerful.41
Chronicled in a popular Netflix film, The Laundromat, starring Meryl
Streep and David Schwimmer,42 the leaks have inspired growing
scholarly literature and media news stories critiquing how anonymous
shell companies facilitate a swarm of illicit activities, ranging from drug
trafficking to tax evasion.43 The trending headlines and academic
accounts, however, almost invariably preclude discussion of the legal
uses of anonymous companies that are both pervasive and almost
infinite in their variations today.44 This Part begins to fill that gap.
Because anonymous companies and shell companies are terms
that are widely used for different purposes, it is important to note the
definitional contours of entities that are the subject of this Article
before proceeding further. The phrase “anonymous companies”
denotes closely held business entities whose owners are practically
unknown to the general public.45 Typically, anonymous companies are
41. See William J. Moon, Regulating Offshore Finance, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2019).
42. See THE LAUNDROMAT (Netflix 2019).
43. See, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson & Jason Sharman, Funding
Terror, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 493–94 (2014); Shima Baradaran, Michael Findley, Daniel Nielson
& J.C. Sharman, Does International Law Matter?, 97 MINN. L. REV. 743, 774 (2013).
44. This is in part because many existing accounts conceptualize anonymous companies as
shell companies: companies devoid of assets or ongoing business activities. See Carl Pacini & Nate
Wadlinger, How Shell Entities and Lack of Ownership Transparency Facilitate Tax Evasion and
Modern Policy Responses to These Problems, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 111, 113 (2018).
45. Thus, for instance, I exclude publicly traded companies that are labeled “shell
companies” under the Securities Exchange Act. See Robert B. Thompson & Donald C.
Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98
CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1588–89 (2013). These “shells” typically underlie reverse mergers that
have become an important alternative to traditional initial public offerings in recent years. See
Ioannis V. Floros & Travis R. A. Sapp, Shell Games: On the Value of Shell Companies, 17 J. CORP.
FIN. 850, 850 (2011). Anonymity is of central importance to closely held firms because investors
with significant ownership stakes in today’s public companies (i.e., with meaningful control over
such firms) are required to disclose a broad spectrum of information to the public through
periodic Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosures. See James J. Park, Rules,
Principles, and the Competition To Enforce the Securities Law, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 133 (2012);
Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65 WASH. U.
L.Q. 131, 131 (1987) (describing the SEC’s Schedule 13D, which “imposes certain disclosure
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formed in jurisdictions that do not require the actual owners of
companies to be disclosed to the public, such as Delaware or the
Cayman Islands. Although most prominently appearing today in the
form of LLCs,46 anonymous companies include other business entities,
including corporations, business trusts, limited liability partnerships
(“LLPs”), and limited partnerships (“LPs”). This definition thus strives
to move beyond investigating anonymous shell companies, which are
“companies devoid of physical or human substance” frequently used
for illicit activities.47
Section I.A sketches the legal architecture underlying the market
for anonymous companies and reviews prevailing scholarly accounts
that predominantly conceptualize anonymous companies as getaway
cars for financial criminals. Section I.B reveals that this understanding
is incomplete because it fails to capture the range of legal business
enterprises whose capital contributors opt for anonymity. It is also
theoretically incompatible with potential socially beneficial functions
advanced by identity shielding. Section I.B thus presents an alternative
theoretical framework aimed at uncovering the privacy function of
modern business entities. Section I.C elaborates on the link between
identity shielding and entrepreneurial risk-taking, showcasing how
identity shielding can facilitate the flow of capital to business
requirements on persons within ten days of the date that they acquire more than five percent of
the beneficial ownership of a public company”). While disclosure is almost always the name of
the game for publicly traded companies in the United States, disclosure requirements mandated
by federal securities regulation are plainly inapplicable to closely held business entities, thereby
preserving the ability of entrepreneurs to conceal the flow of capital from the public’s view. See,
e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Why Delaware LLCs?, 91 OR. L. REV. 57, 68 (2012) (“LLCs rarely sell
interests in the company in public offerings or list such interests for trading on a national securities
exchange[,] [meaning that] LLCs are rarely subject to most federal securities regulation.”).
46. See Telephone Interview with Larry Donahue (Apr. 28, 2021) (notes on file with
author). This is not particularly surprising. Shareholders of traditional corporations famously
delegate control to directors and officers. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation
of Ownership from Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301 (1983). Therefore, the fact that shareholders
remain anonymous is less important because the decisionmakers of those firms are the corporate
managers and not shareholders. LLCs, on the other hand, enable capital contributors—called
members—to retain the power to control business enterprises even while enjoying the benefits of
limited liability. See Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of
Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 425–26 (1992). For a background on the development of LLC
statutes in the United States, see generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, The Ties That Bind: LLC
Operating Agreements as Binding Commitments, 68 SMU L. REV. 811, 813–15 (2015).
47. Delphine Nougayrède, After the Panama Papers: A Private Law Critique of Shell
Companies, 52 INT’L L. 327, 327 (2019); see also FINDLEY, NIELSON & SHARMAN, supra note 5,
at 31 (“Shell corporations are thus companies with nothing more than their basic legal essence,
and as such lack all of the marks of substance . . . .”).
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enterprises by limiting the potential reputational liability accrued to
the firm’s equity owners.
A. The Standard Account: Shell Companies as “Getaway Cars”
In part because of the sensational nature of small offshore
jurisdictions and less populous states emerging as modern hubs of
mass-produced business entities, there is no shortage of academic work
and popular media news stories on the use of shell companies among
celebrities, politicians, and kleptocrats.48 Anonymous companies have
been infamously described by The Financial Times as “getaway cars”
for criminals,49 and they routinely headline popular media outlets as
menaces to the financial system.50
Scholars in law and social science alike have produced an
impressive volume of literature critiquing this practice within the past
decade or so.51 Prominent political scientists, for instance, describe
anonymous shell companies as vehicles used to undertake illicit
activities. Some of the morally rotten transactions include “processing
payments for banned Internet poker businesses; vending controlled
pharmaceuticals illegally; routing money earned from unlawful
subprime credit cards; and sheltering . . . real estate assets.”52 Legal
scholars take a similar approach. Shell companies have been linked to

48. See, e.g., Scott Shane, Spencer Woodman & Michael Forsythe, How Business Titans,
Pop Stars and Royals Hide Their Wealth, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/07/world/offshore-tax-havens.html [https://perma.cc/VL83-BQ2T].
49. Xiangmin Liu, Anonymous Shell Companies Are a Menace to the Financial System, FIN.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/eb76acdc-054b-11ea-a984-fbbacad9e7dd
[https://perma.cc/F3CV-R6K5].
50. See, e.g., Chuck Collins, The Costs of a Secretive ‘Wealth Defense Industry’ of Shell
Companies, Offshore Tax Havens, and Empty Luxury Condos, BOS. GLOBE (Apr. 1, 2021, 11:50
AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/04/01/magazine/costs-secretive-wealth-defense-industr
y-shell-companies-offshore-tax-havens-empty-luxury-condos [https://perma.cc/J4HX-JKG8].
51. See, e.g., OLIVER BULLOUGH, MONEYLAND: WHY THIEVES AND CROOKS NOW RULE
THE WORLD AND HOW TO TAKE IT BACK 21 (2019); JAKE BERNSTEIN, SECRECY WORLD:
INSIDE THE PANAMA PAPERS INVESTIGATION OF ILLICIT MONEY NETWORKS AND THE
GLOBAL ELITE 1–3 (2017); FINDLEY, NIELSON & SHARMAN, supra note 5, at 8–10; NICHOLAS
SHAXSON, TREASURE ISLANDS 11–13 (2011); Lawrence J. Trautman, Following the Money:
Lessons from the Panama Papers, Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV. 807, 807 (2017);
J.C. Sharman, Shopping for Anonymous Shell Companies: An Audit Study of Anonymity and
Crime in the International Financial System, 24 J. ECON. PERSPS. 127, 129–30 (2010).
52. Michael G. Findley, Daniel L. Nielson & J.C. Sharman, Using Field Experiments in
International Relations: A Randomized Study of Anonymous Incorporation, 67 INT’L ORG. 657,
658 (2013).
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illicit activities exposed by the Panama Papers,53 and reportedly
“facilitate tax evasion, impede investigations, and harm society.”54
This line of work typically isolates cash-strapped lawmakers in
small jurisdictions like Delaware or Bermuda as facilitating illicit
activities by offering lax rules to form corporate entities in their
jurisdictions.55 Chief among the concerns are the lax rules governing
the disclosures of the owners of business entities formed in their
jurisdictions.
There is a degree of truth to this understanding. In the United
States, federalism has dictated that the formation of business entities
and the associated rules governing the internal affairs of those entities
are largely a matter of state law.56 A time-honored choice of law rule
enables business entities to shop for the corporate law of any state57—
or, more recently, of any nation58—effectively rendering corporate law
into a set of rules largely amenable to private choice rather than

53. Reid K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust Law: American Reflections on the Panama
Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 105 (2016).
54. Pacini & Wadlinger, supra note 44, at 111 (2018); see also Avnita Lakhani, Imposing
Company Ownership Transparency Requirements: Opportunities for Effective Governance of
Equity Capital Markets or Constraints on Corporate Performance, 16 CHI.-KENT INT’L & COMP.
L. 122, 125 (2016); Dean Kalant, Comment, Who’s in Charge Here? Requiring More Transparency
in Corporate America: Advancements in Beneficial Ownership for Privately Held Companies, 42
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1049, 1053 (2009).
55. See, e.g., Weisbord, supra note 53 (“It is, perhaps, due to these lax documentation and
disclosure requirements that the United States is now considered one of the most favorable
international trust havens and has attracted assets from offshore jurisdictions that recently
tightened their trust-disclosure rules.”).
56. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) (“[S]tate regulation of
corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product
of state law.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs,
48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985) (“To many corporate lawyers, the ‘internal affairs’
doctrine . . . is irresistible if not logically inevitable.”).
57. See Vincent S.J. Buccola, Opportunism and Internal Affairs, 93 TUL. L. REV. 339, 346
(2018) (“[T]he internal affairs doctrine is a choice-of-law rule, pure and simple. It undergirds the
entirety of modern corporate law, and its vitality generally goes unquestioned.”); Frederick Tung,
Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 45–46 (2006); Jens
Dammann & Matthias Schündeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately Held Corporations, 27
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 79, 79 (2011) (“The internal affairs of U.S. corporations are governed by the
law of the state of incorporation. Accordingly, corporations can choose the corporate law
applicable to their internal affairs by incorporating in the state of their choice.”).
58. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s New Competition, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1403, 1420–21
(2020) (synthesizing recent cases extending the internal affairs doctrine to U.S. firms incorporated
in foreign nations).
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territorially-demarcated rules imposed by sovereigns.59 Jurisdictions
chartering business entities thus compete not just by “selling”
corporate governance rules,60 but by bundling their corporate
governance rules with a set of disclosure rules concerning the beneficial
owners of business entities.61 Lawmakers in these jurisdictions, in some
respects, can be conceptualized as having successfully commercialized
their sovereignty into staple revenue streams.62
Within this broader market for business entities, a handful of
states—most notably, Delaware, Nevada, and Wyoming—are actively
competing to attract anonymous companies in part to boost their state
government revenues.63 Delaware’s state government, for instance, has

59. See William J. Moon, Tax Havens as Producers of Corporate Law, 116 MICH. L. REV.
1081, 1095–96 (2018) [hereinafter Moon, Tax Havens].
60. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 228 (1985).
61. This point is currently underappreciated in existing accounts of jurisdictional
competition for business entities, which tend to focus on the quality of the jurisdiction’s corporate
governance rules (and the quality of its judiciary) as the main driver of competition. See, e.g.,
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF UNCORPORATION 131 (2010) (“LLC statutes have evolved
toward both efficiency and uniformity.”); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Delaware for
Small Fry: Jurisdictional Competition for Limited Liability Companies, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 91,
91 (attributing the popularity of Delaware as the state of incorporation to “the quality of
Delaware’s legal system”). It is perhaps of no coincidence that the market leaders in offering
anonymous companies tend to be less populous states that may have the incentive to attract this
breed of business entities. Cf. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE:
MARKET-DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD 41, 43
(2016) (assessing that “market dominant small jurisdictions” that become major players in crossborder financial services, including Delaware and Singapore, have a tendency to be “small and
poorly endowed with natural resources”); Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REGUL. 209, 212 (2006)
(“It is not fortuitous that the dominant incorporation state is a small state . . . . Because a
corporate charter is a relational contract[,] . . . a state needs a mechanism . . . [to] commit to firms
that it will maintain its code and otherwise not undo existing rules to firms’ disadvantage.”).
62. Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 INT’L
ORGS. 151, 151–52 (2002).
63. See Jessie P.H. Poon, Gordon Kuo Siong Tan & Trina Hamilton, Social Power, Offshore
Financial Intermediaries and a Network Regulatory Imaginary, 68 POL. GEOGRAPHY 55, 58 (2019)
(“Nevada, Wyoming and Delaware . . . are hotspots for the registration of offshore shell
companies.”). State governments benefit by deriving annual revenue generated from franchise
taxes or business registration fees. A franchise tax is an annual tax that states charge firms for the
privilege of incorporating in their borders. Michal Barzuza, Does the Structure of the Franchise
Tax Matter?, 96 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 27, 27 (2010). As observed by Professor Michal Barzuza,
“[u]nlike some other taxes, the franchise tax is not a portion of income or revenues.” Id. Interest
groups—including lawyers and registered agents within the states—are important financial
beneficiaries that drive incorporation work into these states. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
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lobbied against numerous iterations of federal legislation requiring
stricter disclosure rules—recognizing the massive revenue stream
provided by chartering anonymous companies.64
Therefore, the ubiquity of shell companies today is not a result of
business enterprises physically relocating to jurisdictions like Wyoming
or Delaware.65 Instead, it is driven by jurisdictions chartering those
business entities—essentially glorified paperwork66—offering lax rules
requiring little to no beneficial ownership information be disclosed to
the public or the chartering government.67
Lax disclosure rules are said to facilitate criminal behavior,68 and
numerous anecdotal accounts reinforce this depiction. For instance,
former President Donald Trump’s presidential campaign manager,
Paul Manafort, was prosecuted by the Department of Justice in 2018
for elaborate tax fraud and bank fraud, which were allegedly facilitated
by LLCs and other business entities formed in Cyprus, Delaware,
Florida, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, New York, the United
Kingdom, and Virginia.69 According to the indictment, Manafort
laundered more than $18 million through dozens of corporate entities
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469,
471–72 (1987).
64. See Suzanne Barlyn, Special Report: How Delaware Kept America Safe for Corporate
Secrecy, REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016, 9:50 AM), https://reut.rs/2bFOLuE [https://perma.cc/49DWRL6R]. The corporate transparency bill in 2016, for instance, was reportedly held back in
Congress after strong opposition from the Delaware Congressional Delegation and the National
Association of Secretaries of State. See Naomi Jagoda, ‘Panama Papers’ Could Boost Prospects
for Corporate-Transparency Legislation, HILL (Apr. 4, 2016, 6:25 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/
finance/275134-panama-papers-could-boost-prospects-for-corporate-transparency-legislation
[https://perma.cc/5FP2-BAHX].
65. For instance, to form a Delaware corporation, a business without previous interaction
with Delaware need only file paperwork, pay a franchise tax, and hire a registered agent who has
“a physical street address in Delaware.” How To Form a New Business Entity, DEL. DIV. CORPS.,
https://corp.delaware.gov/howtoform.shtml [https://perma.cc/XYX7-8HDW].
66. See Moon, Tax Havens, supra note 59, at 1095.
67. Christopher G. Bradley, Artworks as Business Entities: Sculpting Property Rights by
Private Agreement, 94 TUL. L. REV. 247, 251 (2020) (assessing that Delaware “permits LLCs to
be formed with no public disclosure of their purposes or the assets or parties involved,” and the
“[e]ntities then can operate throughout the United States with little restriction”).
68. See, e.g., FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COUNTERTERRORIST FINANCING MEASURES – UNITED STATES, MUTUAL EVALUATION REPORT 4 (2016)
(citing “[l]ack of timely access to adequate, accurate[,] and current beneficial ownership (BO)
information [as] one of the fundamental gaps in the U.S. context”).
69. Government’s Memorandum in Support of Conditions of Release, Complex Case
Designation and Notice of Intent to Use Certain Bank Records at 10–12, United States v.
Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-201), 2017 WL 9487210, at *10–12.
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with names such as Daisy Manafort, LLC and Davis Manafort, Inc.70
The proceeds in turn were used to fund his extravagant lifestyle
(including a $15,000 ostrich leather bomber jacket), along with “his
mortgage, children’s tuition, and interior decorating of his Virginia
residence.”71
The exploitation of shell companies for money laundering and tax
evasion bleeds into other nefarious activities. In 2016, Fair Share
Education Fund published a report connecting anonymous shell
companies to opioid trafficking.72 Dictators, drug dealers, and corrupt
politicians have also been linked to using shell companies to conceal
their proceeds.73
*

*

*

Even the most passionate critics of anonymous shell companies
acknowledge that not all uses of anonymous companies are for illicit
purposes.74 Heather Lowe, legal counsel for the advocacy group Global
Financial Integrity,75 readily acknowledges that “shell companies can
be used for legitimate business purposes.”76 Yet, influential policy
advocates and scholars almost unanimously praise the virtues of full
transparency. The Tax Justice Network, for instance, advocates that
“information on the beneficial owners of every type of legal vehicle
should be available to the general public and accessible online, for free
70. Indictment at 3–4, United States v. Manafort, 314 F. Supp. 3d 258 (D.D.C. 2018) (No.
1:17-cr-00201), 2017 WL 6033301.
71. Id. at 2–3; see also Samantha Schmidt, Paul Manafort’s $15,000 Ostrich Jacket Raises
Tantalizing Questions, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
morning-mix/wp/2018/08/01/paul-manaforts-15000-ostrich-jacket-raises-tantalizing-questions
[https://perma.cc/UN3Y-KMK4].
72. See NATHAN PROCTOR & JULIA LADICS, FAIR SHARE EDUC. FUND, ANONYMITY
OVERDOSE 10 (2016), http://www.fairshareonline.org/sites/default/files/AnonymityOverdose_
Aug1_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J5S-Y32C].
73. See Steve Kroft, Anonymous, Inc., CBS NEWS (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/anonymous-inc-60-minutes-steve-kroft-investigation [https://perma.cc/A3SMM4YZ].
74. See, e.g., Pacini & Wadlinger, supra note 44, at 114 (“Shell entities are not always formed
for illegal purposes, and they are even a valuable source of tax revenues in some countries.”).
75. Global Financial Integrity is a think tank based in Washington, D.C., “focused on illicit
financial flows, corruption, illicit trade and money laundering.” Mission Statement, GLOB. FIN.
INTEGRITY, https://gfintegrity.org [https://perma.cc/5ZG5-798Y].
76. James Rufus Koren, How Disney Used Shell Companies To Start Its Magic Kingdom,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-disney-shellcompanies-20160408-story.html [https://perma.cc/5LER-2AGD] (quoting Heather Lowe).

MOON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1444

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/17/2022 2:32 PM

[Vol. 71:1425

and in open data format.”77 These efforts have ushered in a tidal wave
of legislative reforms around the world in recent years aimed at
bringing transparency to the ownership structure of private
companies.78
While anonymous shell companies undoubtedly facilitate illicit
activities, the prevailing accounts fail to appreciate the range of
important interests advanced by protecting the identity of capital
contributors to legitimate business ventures.79 Without this basic
analysis, we lack an effective framework to grapple with thorny policy
questions of whether and to what extent we ought to harness or
regulate enterprise anonymity. To understand the privacy interests
served by anonymous companies better, we need a paradigm that does
not depict anonymous companies as mere menaces to the financial
system.80 The next Section takes a crack.
B. Business Entities as Privacy Devices
This Section explains how modern business entities serve as
powerful secrecy cloaks that anonymize the source of capital injected
into business enterprises. In some respects, this identity shielding
function relates to but is distinct from the standard conceptualization
of the function of the corporate form. This Section develops a theory
of identity shielding and situates it within the broader literature
concerning the function of modern business entities.81

77. MORAN HARARI, ANDRES KNOBEL, MARKUS MEINZER & MIROSLAV PALANSKÝ,
TAX JUST. NETWORK, OWNERSHIP REGISTRATION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF LEGAL
STRUCTURES FROM AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: STATE OF PLAY OF
BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP – UPDATE 2020, at 2 (2020).
78. See infra Section III.A.
79. See generally J.C. SHARMAN, THE DESPOT’S GUIDE TO WEALTH MANAGEMENT (2017)
(“[T]here is strong reason to think that the United States, given its central place in the global
financial system and the number of companies involved, is the worst in the world when it comes
to regulating shell companies.”).
80. For an example of a piece characterizing anonymous companies as “a menace to the
financial system,” see Liu, supra note 49.
81. This Article benefits from the emerging strand of legal scholarship observing the link
between markets and privacy. Professor Ryan Calo has argued that “[p]rivacy supports the basic
market mechanism by hiding enough distracting, value-laden information from market
participants.” Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 650
(2015). The concept of identity shielding adds support to this line of scholarship in challenging
one of the central assumptions in modern law and economics literature, which tends to treat
privacy pejoratively insofar as it reduces information available to market participants. For
influential accounts, see generally Symposium, The Law and Economics of Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
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It bears noting that the pursuit of financial secrecy enjoys a long
pedigree in history across different societies,82 and the desire for
anonymity in economic life is not an entirely new phenomenon.83 An
inordinate number of people have entered the commercial
marketplace concealing or downplaying their personal information—
including their criminal record, race, education, and sexual
orientation.84
Anonymous companies are cut from the same legal cloth as shell
companies. That is, anonymous companies tend to be formed in
jurisdictions that enable individuals to pool capital for business
ventures without forced public disclosure.85 While relying on a shared
legal blueprint as shell companies, anonymous companies are not just
“companies devoid of physical or human substance.”86 Today, owners
of scores of legitimate business enterprises are virtually unknown to
the general public because they opt for anonymity.87

STUD. 621 (1980) (discussing a broad range of issues on privacy, including the concealment of
information both by firms and individuals). In recent years, the traditional law and economics
framework has been subject to a number of forceful critiques built around the law and political
economy movement. See, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy Kapczynski &
K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the TwentiethCentury Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1790 (2020); Martha T. McCluskey, Frank Pasquale &
Jennifer Taub, Law and Economics: Contemporary Approaches, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297,
301 (2016) (“In a prevailing law and economics framework that defines economic rationality as
essentially unconcerned with fairness and inequality, proposals to advance economic justice can
appear presumptively irrational and unrealistic, closing off the possibilities for beneficial
reform.”).
82. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1154 (2004); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393,
396–97, 407 (1978).
83. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642 (1995) (“There are numerous
situations in which anonymity seems entirely appropriate and even desirable. Psychologists and
sociologists point out that people benefit from being able to assume different personae.”).
84. As Judge Richard Posner observed, “[o]ften people want privacy in order to manipulate
other people by concealing from them aspects of their character, prospects, or past that would if
known reduce their opportunities to engage in advantageous market or nonmarket transactions.”
Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979).
85. See, e.g., infra Section II.B (describing anonymous Black-owned businesses formed in
Delaware).
86. Nougayrède, supra note 47.
87. See FINDLEY, NIELSON & SHARMAN, supra note 5, at 33 (“[M]ost shell companies are
used for legitimate business purposes.”).
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Although almost impossible to pinpoint their exact origin,88
several historical developments have contributed to the explosive
popularity of anonymous companies in recent years. First,
technological innovation has enabled commerce over internet
platforms on a significant scale.89 A century ago, a small business owner
often had a physical footprint that would have enabled consumers or
business partners to identify the owners of enterprises with relative
ease. Today, entrepreneurs selling products through eBay, Etsy,
Shopify, Amazon, and the like can largely operate businesses from
their homes without revealing their true identities.
The demand for identity shielding has also surged because of the
dramatic ease with which personal information can now be obtained—
and instantly publicized—through social media platforms like Twitter
and Facebook.90 Today, a simple Google search could expose personal
information facilitating the identification and harassment of

88. In the most immediate sense, anonymous companies can trace their lineage to business
trusts. Trusts were widely used for business enterprises, particularly in the early twentieth century
in the United States, because they could be formed without public disclosures. As Professor John
Morley explains: “Unlike a corporation, a trust could be formed privately, without any public
filings. A trust thus did not always show up in state records of business organizations. . . .
[A]necdotal evidence . . . shows that the trust remained a major force in American business up
through at least the end of the 1920s.” John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power
of the Trust in Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2166 (2016)
(footnotes omitted); see also Eric C. Chaffee, A Theory of the Business Trust, 88 U. CIN. L. REV.
797, 810–11 (2020) (“Trusts remained a cornerstone of American business for much of the
nineteenth century. . . . For a myriad of different types of businesses, trusts retained their
popularity throughout the 1920s, until corporate law could mature in the United States.”). More
broadly, juridical entities that mediate the relationship between individuals, markets, and
sovereign governments are also not entirely new. Privacy has a long historical pedigree in trusts,
which were a fixture of late-medieval England used to avoid feudal incidents. See J. M. W. BEAN,
THE DECLINE OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM, 1215–1540, at 126 (1968) (documenting the spread of
trusts in late medieval England). Legal scholars have also documented that business entities can
serve as important instruments to evade existing legal restrictions. See Richard R.W. Brooks,
Incorporating Race, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2023, 2045–46 (2006) (documenting how corporations
were deployed during the Jim Crow era to evade racially restrictive covenants); Bradley, supra
note 67, at 251–52 (“By using an LLC, an artist can evade doctrinal restrictions and accomplish
the goals of the Artist’s Contract.”).
89. According to a recent study, home-based businesses, defined as businesses that
“undertake most or all of their activity in the residential home,” now account for the majority of
businesses in the United States. Darja Reuschke & Colin Mason, The Engagement of HomeBased Businesses in the Digital Economy, FUTURES, Mar. 2020, at 1.
90. Kern, supra note 8.
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individuals for their association with a particular business enterprise.91
This is particularly true if a business entity is formed in a jurisdiction
that makes the business owners’ names, home addresses, and phone
numbers searchable on a central database for anyone at any time.
The desire for privacy has become so great that boutique law firms
and registered agents now specialize in forming anonymous companies
enabling entrepreneurs to pursue their business activities without fear
of harassment, cyberstalking, or doxing online.92 These businesses
often tout anonymity as one of the main advantages of forming
business entities in their home states.93 Consider Harvard Business
Services, an incorporation service firm based in Delaware that claims
to have formed over two hundred thousand companies.94 The firm
openly promotes the advantages of privacy offered for business entities
incorporated in Delaware by emphasizing that “the state of Delaware’s
public record will . . . contain no information about . . . LLC’s members
and/or managers.”95 These firms openly compete with one another by

91. Cf. Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1852 (2013) (“The Internet rapidly disseminates disclosure information, and
that facilitates identification—and harassment—of individuals for their speech.”).
92. See, e.g., Maintain Your Privacy with an Anonymous LLC, LAW 4 SMALL BUS. P.C.,
https://www.l4sb.com/services/business-formation/anonymous-llc [https://perma.cc/7DCU-HV7S];
Why Form an LLC in Wyoming?, WYO. TR. & LLC ATT’Y, https://wyoming
llcattorney.com/Form-a-Wyoming-LLC [https://perma.cc/23JY-WG5K]. Doxing is “[t]he public
release of an individual’s private, sensitive, personal information,” often facilitating harassment.
Julia M. MacAllister, The Doxing Dilemma: Seeking a Remedy for the Malicious Publication of
Personal Information, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 2451, 2456 (2017).
93. These businesses can be conceptualized as local “interest groups” that facilitate the
formation of anonymous companies. See Macey & Miller, supra note 63, at 472.
94. About Harvard Business Services, Inc., HARV. BUS. SERVS. INC., https://www.delaware
inc.com/aboutus [https://perma.cc/B83S-AJYN].
95. Delaware LLC: What’s on Public Record?, HARV. BUS. SERVS. INC.,
https://www.delawareinc.com/blog/what-is-on-public-records-delaware [https://perma.cc/KLY83Y5A]. In Professor Frank Gevurtz’s illuminating study based on interviews with business
attorneys whose clients have formed LLCs, out of sixteen surveyed attorneys who invoked “ease
of establishment as a reason for forming LLCs in Delaware,” seven specifically pointed to “the
fact that Delaware did not require disclosure of the names of the LLC’s members, thereby
providing more privacy for LLC members” as the reason for forming LLCs in Delaware. Gevurtz,
supra note 45, at 110–11. Delaware undoubtedly also enjoys a competitive advantage derived
from the state’s status as a branded product in the market for corporate charters. See Omari Scott
Simmons, Branding the Small Wonder: Delaware’s Dominance and the Market for Corporate Law,
42 U. RICH. L. REV. 1129, 1138–39 (2008) (conceptualizing Delaware’s legal regime as a brand in
the market for corporate charters).
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leveraging differentiated features of state law and procedure.96 A
popular Nevada-based incorporator insists that it offers the best
privacy results through a simple transactional cocoon: “Our privacy
service doesn’t provide a nominee unlike many other incorporators. . . .
We create privacy by registering another entity controlled by you to be
the Manager for the Nevada LLC, thereby not giving up control of the
entity, yet not breaking any laws.”97
Of course, the desire to conceal the identity of the owners or
investors of business enterprises is not universal. In professional
service businesses, for instance, firms often go out of their way to
publicize the names of their owners. Typically, major law firms in the
United States use the last names of their founding partners. For
instance, legendary New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz is named after the firm’s prominent partners, who met as students
at New York University School of Law.98 Oprah Winfrey’s widely
publicized ownership stake in Weight Watchers—in which the
disclosure of her 10 percent stake in the company in 2015 was followed
by a skyrocketing of the company’s stock price—is another example of
how public knowledge of the source of capital and ownership may
enhance firm value.99 In these cases, enterprises wanted to publicly
showcase their owners or investors because of the added value of their
identities.
But the reverse can be equally true. By concealing the true identity
of those involved in a business enterprise, anonymity may in fact
enhance business prospects. The economic fate of enterprises may be
affected by anonymity for a number of reasons, including the widely
documented phenomenon of market participants making business
96. One Wyoming-based company advertises to its clients: “Nevada now requires the
names, addresses, date of birth and social security numbers of all the shareholders of their
corporations or LLCs. . . . Wyoming has never asked for the social security numbers of the owners
of any limited liability companies or corporations.” Wyoming vs Nevada Corporations and LLCs,
WYO. REGISTERED AGENT, https://wyomingregisteredagent.com/wyoming-vs-nevada-incorporation
[https://perma.cc/P4NP-L28F].
97. Special: Expedited 1-2 Days Nevada LLC Formation with Las Vegas Address and
Privacy for $1049, NEV. LLC SERVS., https://www.nevadallcservices.com/special-same-daynevada-llc-formation-with-privacy.php [https://perma.cc/PXX2-S3YL].
98. Supporter Spotlight: Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF L.,
https://www.law.nyu.edu/giving/campaign/supporters/wachtell-lipton-rosen-katz [https://perma.cc/
NSV8-GK8Q].
99. See Neate, supra note 24 (documenting that the share price of Weight Watchers more
than doubled after Oprah Winfrey announced her purchase of a ten percent share in the
company).
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decisions based on immutable traits of entrepreneurs—be it race,
gender, or sexual orientation.100 Forced public exposure of the owner
can therefore negatively impact the viability of a business by “outing”
these immutable traits.101 In such contexts, identity shielding allows
entrepreneurs to evade biases and more equitably compete in a
systemically flawed marketplace.
The sirens of conformity can powerfully deter individuals from
funding otherwise legal and socially desirable enterprises. This is
because the business enterprise is often presumed to mirror—whether
rightfully or not—the owner’s identity or political beliefs. Thus, for
instance, a straight man in a small conservative-leaning town who
might personally support LGBTQ rights may still be skittish about
becoming owner or investor in part of a highly lucrative lesbian bar or
an LGBTQ-oriented media company for fear of his community’s
judgment, absent some assurance of privacy. Conformity has an
addictive quality, and many individuals would rather not invest in
enterprises if it means potentially exposing some of their intimate
desires, unusual hobbies, or hidden political viewpoints. Anonymity, in
this regard, ensures that capital flows to enterprises unconstrained by
the fear of public exposure.
In other cases, privacy is sought out by those who want to invest
in promising and innovative business ventures but seek protection from
potential threats of violence or backlash. Privacy interests are
particularly strong among commercial enterprises that operate in
morally contestable industries, including reproductive health care,
firearm sales, gene-editing technology, cannabis, and pornography.102
Abortion-care providers in the United States are prime examples.103 In

100. See Benjamin P. Edwards & Ann C. McGinley, Venture Bearding, 52 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1873, 1873 (2019) (“For all founders, the size, shape, and frequency of the obstacles they
face shifts with perceptions about their identities. Identity alters the economic landscape because
venture capitalists, developers, and others may consciously and unconsciously modulate their
behavior depending on the perceived identity of the founder.”); see also DERALD WING SUE,
MICROAGGRESSIONS IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION 5–10
(2010) (discussing biases against socially marginalized groups in general).
101. Cf. Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 161 (2015)
(examining the constitutionality of the forced outing of “individuals’ sexuality, gender identity,
HIV status, and political beliefs by the government”).
102. See infra Section II.A.
103. Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a
Response to Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 464 (2013) (“[I]t bears noting
that death threats are frequently used to induce fear and to intimidate, rather than to convey an

MOON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1450

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

3/17/2022 2:32 PM

[Vol. 71:1425

2019 alone, abortion providers reported over three thousand “targeted
incidents of hate mail and harassing phone calls” along with ninety-two
instances of “death threats and threats of harm.”104 Consider providers
in Louisiana, a state where anti-abortion regulations have driven out
all but a handful of abortion-care providers.105 Recently, providers have
been “targeted at private offices, hospitals, and disturbingly, their
children’s daycare centers.”106 One provider, referred to as “Dr. John
Doe 1” in court documents, tried to hide his identity, but “that didn’t
stop protesters from accosting him . . . or sending nasty mailers about
him to his neighbors.”107 It is no wonder why potential investors take
utmost care to protect their identity from public disclosure, given that
“[e]ven a tenuous association with abortion care in Louisiana has
presaged harassment and violence.”108

actual intent to kill. However, . . . [i]n other contexts such as with abortion doctors, zealots have
followed through on their threats to kill people.”).
104. NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 2019 VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION STATISTICS 4 (2020),
https://5aa1b2xfmfh2e2mk03kk8rsx-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/NAF-2019Violence-and-Disruption-Stats-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE9E-3Q88].
105. Kathaleen Pittman, I Run a Louisiana Abortion Clinic. Despite Supreme Court Win, I’m
Nervous For Our Future, USA TODAY (July 1, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/opinion/voices/2020/06/30/supreme-court-june-medical-services-abortion-rights-accesscolumn/3283212001 [https://perma.cc/297T-89HG].
106. Brief of Feminist Majority Foundation, National Organization for Women Foundation,
Southern Poverty Law Center, and Women’s Law Project as Amici Curiae in Support of June
Medical Services L.L.C., et al. at 12, June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020) (No.
18-1323, 18-1460), 2019 WL 6698206, at *12 [hereinafter Brief of Feminist].
107. Jessica Mendoza, The View from One of the Last Abortion Clinics in Louisiana,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 13, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/
2019/0613/The-view-from-one-of-the-last-abortion-clinics-in-Louisiana [https://perma.cc/EJ7VFHEX].
108. Brief of Feminist, supra note 106, at 13. In Germantown, Maryland, for example, even
the landlord of an abortion clinic has been targeted by anti-abortion activists. See Petula Dvorak,
A Clinic’s Landlord Turns the Tables on Anti-Abortion Protesters, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-clinics-landlord-turns-the-tables-on-anti-abortionprotesters/2012/03/29/gIQAThgwiS_story.html [https://perma.cc/PZ8L-LK3K] (“[Anti-abortion
activists] showed up at [the landlord’s] daughter’s middle school on the first day of classes and
again at back-to-school night. They had signs displaying his name and contact information as well
as those gory images of the fetuses. . . . Soon after that, the harassing calls started coming to his
home.”). This is critical, given that abortion clinics often fail to secure sufficient funding to open
their doors. As reported in Bloomberg, abortion-care business owners often get denied funding
from traditional lending outlets once they reveal their line of business. Cynthia Koons & Rebecca
Greenfield, Abortion Clinics Are Getting Nickel-and-Dimed Out of Business, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 27, 2020, 10:29 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2020-0227/abortion-clinics-are-the-most-challenging-small-business-in-america [https://perma.cc/E7322AMC]. As one abortion clinic owner in Kansas who was denied funding from Bank of America
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Constraints on the flow of capital to certain business enterprises
are not just limited to ventures that may incite threats of physical
violence or harassment toward owners or investors. The social cost
inflicted by the publicity in the event of business failure can also serve
as a deterrent to entrepreneurship.109 The social cost of business failure
is well known in the management literature.110 In addition to the loss of
important social network, business failure generates a sense of stigma
for entrepreneurs that “can also lead to negative discrimination with
respect to employment opportunities and access to future resources.”111
Because anonymous companies enable entrepreneurs to avoid public
disclosure in the event of business failure, it can serve as an important
catalyst for entrepreneurial risk-taking that may benefit society at
large.112
Anonymous companies have thus become a staple feature of
modern economic life by providing the means to achieve identity
shielding—a powerful force that impacts the propensity of individuals
to take on entrepreneurial risk. This feature, which has earned the
imprimatur of the natural selection process in the market for business
entities, ought to be taken seriously because it disrupts conventional
accounts concerning the function of the corporate form.
C. Identity Shielding and Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking
The concept of identity shielding enriches the prevailing scholarly
accounts concerning the function of the corporate form. According to

to Wells Fargo to smaller regional institutions recalls: “After I announced that we would be
providing abortion care, that’s where the conversation stopped.” Id.
109. I am grateful to Professor Eric Chaffee and Dr. Chris Cho for raising this point.
110. See, e.g., Jason Cope, Entrepreneurial Learning From Failure: An Interpretative
Phenomenological Analysis, 26 J. BUS. VENTURING 604, 605 (2011) (“[T]he emotional impact of
failure is inextricably linked to its social cost, particularly the ability of failure to detach
entrepreneurs from their naturalistic community of collaborators.”); Smita Singh, Patricia Corner
& Kathryn Pavlovich, Coping With Entrepreneurial Failure, 13 J. MGMT. & ORG. 331, 336–37
(2007) (“Entrepreneurs reported substantive social impact from venture loss in that three of their
five marriages broke up within a few months of the business failure. Also, two of the
entrepreneurs reported a social distance from friends and from family members due to feelings
of embarrassment or guilt . . . .”).
111. Deniz Ucbasaran, Dean A. Shepherd, Andy Lockett & S. John Lyon, Life After Business
Failure: The Process and Consequences of Business Failure for Entrepreneurs, 39 J. MGMT. 163,
177 (2013).
112. Id. at 164 (“If the costs of failure (i.e., financial, social, and psychological) are too high
compared to the benefits of learning from failure, entrepreneurs may choose to exit their
entrepreneurial careers. In such a situation, both the entrepreneur and society may lose out.”).
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the standard account, the legal personality assigned to the corporate
form serves to partition assets in the eyes of the law.113 Stripped of its
metaphysical narrative, asset partitioning is the idea that firms are
separate legal persons from natural persons who own and control those
entities,114 thereby enabling two critical functions of the corporate
form: entity shielding and limited liability.115
Entity shielding partitions firm assets from those of the owners,
thereby reserving those assets for the firm’s creditors.116 Entity
shielding is considered to be an essential feature of modern firms by
today’s leading legal scholars,117 for it “reduces the cost of credit for
legal entities by reducing monitoring costs, protecting against
premature liquidation of assets, and permitting efficient allocation of
risk.”118 To illustrate, imagine that I operate a food truck specializing
in selling jumbo lump crab cakes.119 If I operated the food truck without
forming a business entity, my credit card lenders like American
Express and Chase could at any time tow away the truck that belongs
to my business if I default on my personal loans. The same is not true
if I operate the food truck through an LLC or a corporation. Entity
shielding ensures that only my business creditors (say, my Chesapeake

113. As Professors Hansmann and Kraakman explain, “designation of a separate pool of
assets that are associated with the firm, and that are distinct from the personal assets of the firm’s
owners and managers . . . is done by recognizing juridical persons . . . that are distinct from
individual human beings and that can own assets in their own name.” Hansmann & Kraakman,
Essential Role, supra note 12, at 393. Although asset partitioning is principally associated with the
function of corporations, the concept has been extended to other business entities. Hansmann,
Kraakman & Squire, New Business, supra note 13.
114. See Pollman, Reconceiving, supra note 15.
115. Blair, Locking, supra note 12.
116. Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, Law and the Rise, supra note 12, at 1335.
117. Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 398. It is now fairly wellaccepted that “the law is essential in providing the corporation with distinct property rights and,
in particular, a dedicated pool of assets shielded from the shareholders’ personal creditors.” DariMattiacci, supra note 18, at 194.
118. Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 398. In a later work, Professors
Hansmann and Kraakman, joined by Professor Squire, write that entity shielding brings about “a
lower cost of credit for firm owners, reduced bankruptcy administration costs, enhanced stability,
and the possibility of a market in shares.” Hansmann, Kraakman & Squire, Law and the Rise,
supra note 12, at 1335.
119. I am indebted to Professor Morley’s illustration of entity shielding for this example. See
Morley, supra note 88, at 2167–68.
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Bay blue crab suppliers) can go after business assets, ensuring that
capital is locked into the food truck to perform its intended return.120
Relatedly, asset partitioning insulates firm owners from business
debts. For instance, if a consumer develops a serious illness from eating
my crab cakes and successfully brings a million-dollar tort suit against
my food truck business, my personal assets will generally be
unreachable to that tort creditor. This is the concept of limited liability
that every teacher of Business Associations tries to drill into their law
students as a foundational feature of modern corporate law.121 Limited
liability’s importance as a tool for encouraging socially productive risktaking is widely appreciated.122 For example, not many people will start
a local clinic offering essential medical services or a Spanish tapas wine
bar offering first-class seafood paella without some degree of assurance
that their home or wedding rings are not up for grabs by business
creditors—say, if a global pandemic or an unfortunate listeria outbreak
bankrupts the business.123 These commercial ventures generate a range
of benefits for society, including “financial returns to investors, jobs for
employees, and desirable products and services for consumers.”124
While a healthy scholarly debate persists as to whether limited
liability is truly essential to the corporate form,125 limited liability’s

120. Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12. As Professor Morley explains,
“[e]ntity shielding stops the owners and creditors of a business from taking the assets of the
business away before the assets have had a chance to perform their intended purpose and produce
an investment return.” Morley, supra note 88, at 2167.
121. See BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 2–3.
122. See id. at 47; Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50
MD. L. REV. 80, 99–107 (1991); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm,
141 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 601, 601–02 (1985).
123. As Professor Herbert Hovenkamp assesses, “[l]imited liability clearly encouraged the
flow of capital into new enterprise.” HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW: 1836–1937, at 54 (1991). As an added bonus, limited liability relieves creditors from having
to monitor the potential personal liability of the owners in extending the credit. See Hansmann &
Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 404.
124. Millon, supra note 31.
125. Compare BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 19 (“Limited liability is
arguably the most important characteristic of the modern corporation.”), with Hansmann,
Kraakman & Squire, Law and the Rise, supra note 12, at 1336 (“While limited liability has evident
and important functional complementarities to entity shielding, it is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the creation of business firms as separate and distinct economic actors. Firms can
prosper without limited liability, but significant enterprises lacking entity shielding are largely
unknown in modern times.”).
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impact on the broader history of modern economic life is undeniable.126
As Professors Stephen Bainbridge and Todd Henderson assess, “[i]t is
not an exaggeration to say that our capitalist society probably could
not exist, as we know it, without the principle of limited liability.”127
Largely unexplored in this body of literature is the privacy
function served by modern business entities.128 This feature is critical
to analyze because the set of interests advanced by identity shielding
126. See Nicolas M. Butler, President of Columbia Univ., Address at the 143d Annual
Banquet of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York (Nov. 16, 1911), in WILLIAM
MEADE FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 21 (1917) (“[I]n
my judgment the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery of modern times. . .
.”). Scholars have, for instance, theorized that limited liability has allowed for widened
participation in the marketplace and equalized opportunities to gain wealth, since entrepreneurs
need not fear losing more capital than they invested. See Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing
of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 148, 155–56
(1992).
127. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 19; see also Blair, Locking, supra note
12, at 390 (“[C]hartering of a corporation legally transformed the business enterprise in ways that
would have been impossible or extremely difficult to achieve through individual proprietorship,
partnership, or other forms of contract law . . . .”). Modern business entities are thus credited with
lowering the transactional costs of individuals pooling capital for business ventures, limiting the
liability to the owners of the businesses, and protecting such enterprises from untimely
dissolutions. See Andrew Verstein, Enterprise Without Entities, 116 MICH. L. REV. 247, 248–49
(2017).
128. Instead, when discussing the intersection of corporations and privacy, the prevailing
literature has primarily focused on examining (1) the data privacy of various stakeholders
impacted by corporations, and (2) the right to privacy for corporations as a matter of U.S.
constitutional law. For influential accounts on the former, see H. JEFF SMITH, MANAGING
PRIVACY: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND CORPORATE AMERICA 93 (1994) (“[M]ost
executives wait until an external threat forces them to consider their privacy policies.”); Kenneth
A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV.
247, 251 (2011) (“Between 1995 and 2010, corporate privacy management in the United States
has undergone a profound transformation. Thousands of companies have created ‘chief privacy
officer’ positions, a development often accompanied by prominent publicity campaigns.”);
Victoria L. Schwartz, Corporate Privacy Failures Start at the Top, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1693
(2016) (“[E]ven corporations not directly in the privacy business must also make important
decisions potentially impacting the privacy of their employees, consumers, and shareholders.”).
For important scholarship concerning whether corporations ought to be afforded privacy rights
as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, see Pollman, Corporate, supra note 20, at 32 (“This Article
argues that most corporations in most circumstances should not have a constitutional right to
privacy.”); Orts & Sepinwall, supra note 20, at 2278 (“[W]e do not think the conclusion that ‘most
corporations in most circumstances should not have a constitutional right to privacy’ is justified
by the normative and legal arguments presented.”); Buccola, supra note 20, at 499
(“Constitutional rights are ascribed to corporations such that entrepreneurs are neither rewarded
nor punished for choosing the corporate form over other modes of coordination . . . .”); see also
Anita L. Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual
Quandaries for the Common Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 607, 607–09 (1987) (assessing whether
corporations should have privacy rights at common law).
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are not entirely disjointed from the functional goals of modern business
entities identified in existing scholarly accounts.
Similar to how the rule of limited liability incentivizes
entrepreneurial risk-taking,129 identity shielding encourages the flow of
capital to certain business ventures that would otherwise be
underfunded or not be funded at all. The risks protected by identity
shielding, however, are distinct from risks protected by the doctrine of
limited liability. Canonical understanding of limited liability frames
risk in terms of the loss of capital. That is, limited liability helps
overcome risk aversion of individuals and facilitates capital formation
by preventing “investors from losing more than the capital they invest
in a business.”130 Identity shielding, on the other hand, encourages the
flow of capital to business enterprises by preserving the individual’s
ability to control knowledge about oneself to the world.131
In this regard, identity shielding might be conceptualized as
providing limited reputational liability, as opposed to limited capital
liability.132 Like the doctrine of limited liability, assuring anonymity
does not only promote enterprise that results in desirable products and
services for consumers, but also may generate tax revenues and
technological innovation to benefit society.133 The link between
identity shielding and innovation should not be particularly surprising.
As Professor Julie Cohen observes, “[c]onditions of diminished privacy
also impair the capacity to innovate . . . because innovation requires
the capacity for critical perspective on one’s environment and because

129. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 47 (“By reducing a project’s riskiness to
the entrepreneur, limited liability thus may encourage business risk taking and, as a result,
economic growth.”).
130. Simkovic, supra note 28, at 277.
131. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 483 (1968) (defining privacy as “control
over knowledge about oneself”).
132. I am grateful to the invaluable input of Professor Christopher Bradley on this point.
133. Professor David Millon emphasizes the importance of limited liability as a tool for risk
reallocation:
The real policy basis for limited liability . . . seems to be to promote investment by
transferring risk from investors to creditors. Commercial activity can generate a range
of social benefits, including financial returns to investors, jobs for employees, and
desirable products and services for consumers. The general public also benefits from
tax revenues and, less directly but no less importantly from the advantages of ongoing
technological progress. . . .
Millon, supra note 31 (footnote omitted).
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innovation . . . requires room to tinker, and therefore thrives most fully
in an environment that values and preserves spaces for tinkering.”134
In some cases, identity shielding impacts the propensity of
individuals to take on business risk because any given individual’s
involvement in business ventures may reveal not only their financial
position, but a trove of sensitive information about people’s personal
lives.135 In this sense, identity shielding involves preserving privacy
interests that are intricately linked to personal autonomy. Professor
Laurence Tribe explains that privacy allows individuals “to shape the
‘self’ that one presents to the world, and on the basis of which the world
in turn shapes one’s existence.”136 This reality is already recognized in
other areas of the law.137 For instance, trusts used to transfer wealth
enable individuals to control their identities and reputations even
beyond death.138 Trust law denies the general public access to trust
instruments, for they may reveal intimate details about an individual,
including their sexual orientation.139 Similarly, business ventures are
not always mere passive investment vehicles. Rather, they are social
activities that can reveal intimate details about an entrepreneur’s (or
an investor’s) closeted sexuality, religious affiliations, unusual hobbies,
and political beliefs.
In other cases, preserving identifying information from public
exposure can help safeguard the entrepreneur’s physical safety. That
is, absent anonymity, a business creditor or a dissatisfied customer can

134. Cohen, supra note 29; see also Frank Pasquale, Redescribing Health Privacy: The
Importance of Information Policy, 14 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 95, 125 (2014) (“In a growing
variety of contexts, rights to privacy are critical to motivate the creation of knowledge. . . . We
increasingly find ourselves needing to consider knowledge systems, ecologies built over time and
space, rather than the efficiency or fairness of single transactions in the knowledge economy.”).
135. See infra Section II.A.
136. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1304, 1389–90 (2d ed. 1988).
137. Privacy rights, although notoriously difficult to conceptualize, are enshrined in a
patchwork of laws in the United States. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 1
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Harms, 102 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (manuscript at 3), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2790&
context=faculty_publications [https://perma.cc/6CNR-Y8VL].
138. Frances H. Foster, Trust Privacy, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 555, 566, 569–70 (2008) (“Trust
law has placed such a premium on privacy that it has denied trust beneficiaries as well as the
general public access to the trust instrument.”).
139. Id. at 559–60; see also Matthew R. Dubois, Note, Legal Planning for Gay, Lesbian, and
Non-Traditional Elders, 63 ALB. L. REV. 263, 322 & n.308 (1999) (assessing that planning through
wills, which are part of the public record “may subject the private lives of your gay, lesbian, or
non-traditional elder to unwanted scrutiny”).
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always knock on the doors of the actual owners of the business and
perhaps shake down the owners informally, even if there might not be
a legal recourse under the doctrine of limited liability. Indeed, there
are far too many reports of violence and harassment toward owners of
business enterprises that discourage investment in socially productive
enterprises.140 For vast swaths of e-commerce businesses, the potential
for doxing and cyber-harassment, moreover, can serve as a powerful
constraint for individuals to take on entrepreneurial risk. Coloradobased lawyer Paul Miller, who specializes in forming LLCs for small
businesses, advises his clients to form anonymous companies “as a
matter of course” because of the pervasive risk of doxing or harassment
in today’s market environment.141
To be clear, the assessment that privacy advances some of the
functional features traditionally associated with the corporate form
does not mean that identity shielding must be pursued at all costs.142
Rather, the exposition serves to understand fully what is at stake
regarding anonymity and business enterprises. Take, for example, the
rule of limited liability. Although credited with encouraging socially
productive risk-taking, limited liability has social costs in the form of
allowing enterprises “to externalize a certain amount of costs and risks
onto third parties.”143 Yet, that is a feature of modern business entities
that many legal scholars have come to accept as “the most important

140. Consider a recent incidence of a disturbing threat targeting at least ten Black business
owners in Philadelphia. As reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer, the emails, littered with racial
slurs, “threatened to burn down businesses and rape women, and questioned the intelligence of
Blacks.” Mensah M. Dean, Racist Emails Hit Black-Owned Small Businesses in Philly, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Sept. 3, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/news/racism-emails-small-business-ownersphiladelphia-police-20200903.html [https://perma.cc/RUN2-LFFH].
141. Telephone Interview with Paul Miller (Sept. 9, 2021) (notes on file with author).
142. Indeed, even the doctrine of limited liability does not offer absolute protection for
owners of firms. Corporate law recognizes a doctrine called “veil piercing” designed to provide
an exception to limited liability. See Peter B. Oh, Veil-Piercing Unbound, 93 B.U. L. REV. 89, 90
(2013). The notoriously murky jurisprudence on veil piercing injects uncertainty regarding limited
liability protection to investors of business entities. See id. at 89 (“Veil-piercing is an equitable
remedy. This simple insight has been lost over time. What started as a means for corporate
creditors to reach into the personal assets of a shareholder has devolved into a doctrinal black
hole.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 481 (2001) (“The
standards by which veil piercing is effected [sic] are vague, leaving judges great discretion. The
result has been uncertainty and lack of predictability, increasing transaction costs for small
businesses.”). Similarly, it is entirely plausible that societies can preserve identity shielding as the
default rule and carve out exceptions overcoming that default in appropriate circumstances.
143. BAINBRIDGE & HENDERSON, supra note 21, at 3.
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advance in the organization of business enterprises.”144 Albeit
noteworthy dissents published in prominent law reviews,145 limited
liability is sanctified in virtually every state’s corporate code governing
the laws of business entities.146 By examining the broader functional
dimensions of privacy served by anonymous companies, this Article
hopes to stimulate a less myopic and more productive discussion
regarding the extent to which any given society ought to harness or
regulate these interests.
II. THE HIDDEN VIRTUES OF IDENTITY SHIELDING
This Part elaborates on the set of interests advanced by identity
shielding by sketching the real-life workings of anonymous companies.
It shows how identity shielding facilitates the unadulterated flow of
capital—that may otherwise be deterred by personal, social, and moral
constraints—into business enterprises. My analysis is not proffered as
a comprehensive taxonomy of identity shielding. Rather, it is aimed at
crystalizing the idea that privacy can unlock a range of humanistic and
economic interests. It is my hope that these contemporary examples
can serve as a proof of concept that can inspire future research to
further shed light on the topic.
Section II.A demonstrates anonymous companies as incubators of
morally contestable enterprises by documenting how identity shielding
144. Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Entity Shielding and the Development
of Business Forms: A Comparative Perspective, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 238, 238 (2005) (“Scholars
have generally assumed that the most important advance in the organization of business
enterprises has been the development of forms that grant all members of a firm limited liability,
thus enabling them to protect their personal assets from claims against the enterprise.”).
145. See Hansmann & Kraakman, Toward Unlimited, supra note 21 (“[L]imited liability in
tort cannot be rationalized for either closely-held or publicly-traded corporations on the strength
of the conventional arguments offered on its behalf. In fact, there may be no persuasive reasons
to prefer limited liability over a regime of unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate
torts.”); Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12 (arguing that limited liability is
“of distinctly secondary importance”); Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct
and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1,
2 (1994) (“The liability that is avoided does not disappear into a black hole; it falls onto another
person. If the liability is shifted to a tort victim, the use of the corporate form seems particularly
troublesome, permitting the enterprise to externalize part of the cost of doing business.”); David
W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1568–69
(1991) (arguing for the abrogation of limited liability for certain corporate subsidiaries).
146. See Armour et al., supra note 20, at 8–9 (assessing that the rule of limited liability “has
over time become nearly universal”); see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22(b) (Am. Bar Ass’n
2002) (providing for shareholder limited liability unless liability might be warranted by virtue of
the shareholder’s own conduct).
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enabled those who believe in female reproductive autonomy to launch
the first abortion drug in the United States. Section II.B describes
anonymous companies as “race-neutral” platforms for small business
entrepreneurs by documenting how Black entrepreneurs use
anonymous companies to more equitably compete in a marketplace
infected with systemic racism. Section II.C discusses anonymous
companies as entrepreneurial “safe houses” by documenting how
survivors of intimate partner violence use anonymous companies to
pursue business ventures without threats of stalking, violence, and
harassment.
A. Incubating Morally Contestable Enterprises
Today, more than half of U.S. women seeking abortion care
during the first ten weeks of gestation rely on medical (or medication)
abortion.147 As a safe and effective option in early pregnancy,148
medical abortion is often preferred to surgical abortion because it “is
noninvasive and can be completed in a patient’s chosen setting, such as
at home.”149 Notwithstanding the contentious legal battle in a recent
Supreme Court case of Food and Drug Administration v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists150 over whether an inperson doctor’s visit is required to access the abortion drug during the
COVID-19 pandemic,151 medical abortion remains a mainstream way
for U.S. women to access abortion.
It was not always like this. Although the drug compound used in
medical abortion, mifepristone, was first approved and distributed in
France in 1988, and then a few years later in the United Kingdom and

147. Food & Drug Admin. v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. 578, 579
(2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
148. Jillian T. Henderson, Ann C. Hwang, Cynthia C. Harper & Felicia H. Stewart, Safety of
Mifepristone Abortions in Clinical Use, 72 CONTRACEPTION 175, 175 (2005) (“In approving
mifepristone, the FDA considered data from clinical trials showing mifepristone to be safe and
effective for early pregnancy termination. Subsequent studies have helped refine regimens used
for medication abortion.” (citation omitted)).
149. See Medication Abortion, GUTTMACHER INST. (Feb. 2021), https://www.gutt
macher.org/evidence-you-can-use/medication-abortion [https://perma.cc/E8HU-Z27T].
150. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 141 S. Ct. at 578.
151. As Justice Sonia Sotomayor describes in her scathing dissent, “[o]f the over 20,000 FDAapproved drugs, mifepristone is the only one that the FDA requires to be picked up in person for
patients to take at home.” Id. at 579 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Sweden,152 women in the United States did not have access to the drug
until 2000. The fears surrounding those providing reproductive health
services served as a significant barrier to manufacturing and
distributing the drug despite the high consumer demand.153 In the
1980s, anti-abortion activists had been linked to the deaths of doctors
who provided abortion services, and pharmaceutical companies had
been effectively shamed into refusing the production of the drug for
the U.S. market.154 As reported in The Los Angeles Times, in the
United States, “not a single pharmaceutical company stepped up to the
plate to help research, make[,] or manufacture the drug.”155
It was for this reason in part that in 1994, the French patent holder
Roussel Uclaf S.A. voluntarily transferred its U.S. patent rights to
mifepristone without compensation to the Population Council, a
nonprofit organization based in New York.156 Even so, the capital
investments necessary to conduct clinical trials for regulatory approval
required the raising of at least $50 million in capital.157

152. Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Sujata Lalitkumar, Second Trimester Medical Abortion
with Mifepristone–Misoprostol and Misoprostol Alone: A Review of Methods and Management,
16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 162, 163 (2008).
153. R. Alta Charo, A Political History of RU-486, in BIOMEDICAL POLITICS 43, 60 (Kathi
E. Hanna ed., 1991) (“A Louis Harris survey, released on October 12, 1988, found that 82 percent
of Americans supported government spending on research and development of new
contraceptives and 59 percent thought that RU-486 should be made available in the United
States.”).
154. See id. at 54 (“Publicly, pharmaceutical companies claimed they were not concerned by
the boycott threat. Privately, however, according to the New York Times, the message was
different. ‘The reasons are obvious,’ said one unnamed company executive, ‘and we don’t want
to get into it.’”); Carole Joffe & Tracy A. Weitz, Normalizing the Exceptional: Incorporating the
“Abortion Pill” into Mainstream Medicine, 56 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2353, 2354–55 (2003) (“The pill
immediately became entangled in international antiabortion politics—including visits to France
by both abortion proponents and opponents from the United States, with the latter threatening
boycotts of the manufacturer’s other products if the pill were to become available in the US.”).
155. Bernstein, supra note 25.
156. The Washington Post noted:
The French firm that makes RU-486 . . . will give away its U.S. patent rights to help
bring the drug to market here. . . . Roussel is giving up potential American profits from
sale of the drug because of its stated reluctance to market RU-486 in the highly charged
U.S. political climate surrounding the issue of abortion.
John Schwartz, Abortion Pill on Way to U.S. Market After Rights Deal, WASH. POST (May 17,
1994), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1994/05/17/abortion-pill-on-way-to-us-mark
et-after-rights-deal/8a2d196b-feb6-4a67-a513-73ae606abc1d [https://perma.cc/4MLN-82JA].
157. Bernstein, supra note 25 (“The pill’s 11-year journey to the United States included a
cloak-and-dagger scheme to hide the identities of participants from anti-abortion activists . . . and
a price tag of at least $50 million.”).
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Danco Laboratories—the company associated with the
Population Council and now known to have been behind the clinical
trials necessary to win Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approval in the United States—was cloaked in secrecy.158 Everything
from the company’s telephone number to its exact headquarter address
remained anonymous.159 In fact, company officials only disclosed that
Danco was housed in an ordinary suite of offices “somewhere in
‘midtown Manhattan.’”160 For security reasons, it was particularly
critical that the identity of investors was kept secret from the public.161
These privacy goals were accomplished by the deployment of
anonymous companies formed in the Cayman Islands. The complex
corporate structure of Danco Laboratories, strategically developed
with the help of lawyer–activist Joseph Pike, is now well-documented:
Pike had set up shop as a nonprofit, calling his organization Advances
in Health Technologies. But the company also had two for-profit
subsidiaries—Danco Laboratories Ltd. and Neogen Holdings.
Another entity, listed in California state documents as Danco
Investors Group LP, was registered in the Cayman Islands, where the
identities of officers and partners are not required to be disclosed.
The general partner for Danco Investors Group, N.D. Management
Inc., also is based in the Cayman Islands.162

The decision to use anonymous companies to pool capital for
clinical trials was deliberate, “because participants feared that they
would be targeted by abortion opponents, some of whom had assaulted
and even killed doctors who had performed abortions.”163 Even the
FDA safeguarded the privacy of those involved in its approval process.
In an unprecedented move, when the FDA finally announced the
158. Margaret Talbot, The Little White Bombshell, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 1999),
https://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/11/magazine/the-little-white-bombshell.html [https://perma.cc/
VN5V-ELDD].
159. Joffe & Weitz, supra note 154, at 2355 (“The security issues surrounding this enterprise
are so great that Danco operates out of an office with an unlisted phone, and with the name of
another company on its door.”).
160. Id.; Melody Petersen, Abortion Pill Distributor Energized by New Mission, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 30, 2000), https://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/30/us/abortion-pill-distributor-energized-bynew-mission.html [https://perma.cc/HT44-UFGT].
161. Petersen, supra note 160 (“There are still many things that Danco will not disclose,
including the names of its investors. Ms. O’Neill said the group included wealthy individuals and
foundations that supported abortion rights.”).
162. Bernstein, supra note 25.
163. Petersen, supra note 160.
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approval of the sale of the drug in 2000, it “refus[ed] to disclose the
name or location of the manufacturer.”164 The potential risk of being
associated with the commercialization of the pill required that almost
everyone involved be kept under seal.
As the saga of bringing mifepristone to the United States
demonstrates, anonymity can enable the pooling of capital by
protecting investors from the backlash of unpopular enterprises that
arguably serve socially beneficial functions. The broader societal
implications of identity shielding as an incubator for morally
contestable business ventures remain vast and transcend political
viewpoints.165
B. Evading “Racialized” Market Biases
By now, most Americans have at least some understanding about
systemic racism that contributes to the subordination of Black people
in the United States. This ranges from police brutality,166 electronic
surveillance,167 home-ownership discrimination,168 employment
discrimination,169 health care disparity,170 to banking discrimination
and predatory lending.171
The commercial marketplace is not immune from racial biases. In
an illuminating empirical work, Professors Ian Ayres, Mahzarin
164. Joffe & Weitz, supra note 154, at 2355.
165. Indeed, according to a law firm partner specializing in forming anonymous LLCs, the
entrepreneurs seeking anonymity are diverse, including gun shop, abortion clinic, and collection
agency owners. See Telephone Interview with Larry Donahue, supra note 46. This point is
important, given “that one person’s ethical consumption can be another’s discrimination.” See
Calo, supra note 81, at 649 n.3.
166. See Maneka Sinha, Radically Reimagining Forensic Science, 73 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 67–68), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3891788 [https://perma.cc/
XX85-UKV8]; Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405,
419 (2018).
167. See Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-Carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 655
(2019).
168. See RICHARD R. W. BROOKS & CAROL M. ROSE, SAVING THE NEIGHBORHOOD:
RACIALLY RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, LAW, AND SOCIAL NORMS 140–67 (2013).
169. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1705,
1721 (2000). The phenomenon of colorism, or discrimination based on skin tone, exacerbates the
discrimination against darker-skinned Black people. See id. at 1709–10 (“Even today, [B]lacks
with light brown skin tones, although clearly identified as [B]lack, may have some economic
advantage over [B]lacks with darker skin tones, especially in workplace settings.”).
170. See Matiangai Sirleaf, Racial Valuation of Diseases, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1820, 1820 (2021).
171. See JANIS SARRA & CHERYL WADE, PREDATORY LENDING AND THE DESTRUCTION
OF THE AFRICAN AMERICAN DREAM 3 (2020).
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Banaji, and Christine Jolls demonstrated that baseball cards held by a
dark skinned/African American hand on eBay sold for approximately
20 percent less than those held by a light skinned/Caucasian hand.172
The study provided striking evidence of the disproportionately
negative outcomes for Black sellers in ordinary market transactions
“even when there is no opportunity to observe demeanor,
socioeconomic status, or other nonrace but potentially race correlated
features of potential transaction partners.”173 In another famous field
experiment study selling iPods through local online classified
advertisements throughout the United States, economists Jennifer
Doleac and Luke Stein similarly found that “Black sellers receive
fewer and lower offers than white sellers.”174
Unsurprisingly, many Black entrepreneurs conceal information of
their business ownership. The common reasons Black entrepreneurs
cite for choosing anonymity include the misperception that their
products or services are only for Black consumers—or racism by
potential investors, consumers, and business partners.175 Pepper Miller,
a Black consumer marketing expert, explains the Black entrepreneurs’
decisions to downplay Black ownership: “It’s not about anybody selling
out. People are trying to survive. There’s a perception that [B]lack
people can only do [B]lack stuff.”176
Consider Duane Draughon, a Black owner of a patio installation
company in Illinois interviewed by The Chicago Tribune.177 In growing
his business, Draughon intentionally concealed his ownership of the
company, going to the lengths of having “no photos of him or his family
on his website; giving potential customers the impression the business
was part of a franchise and that he was a project manager, not the
owner; and recruiting a white insurance company representative to
172. Ian Ayres, Mahzarin Banaji & Christine Jolls, Race Effects on eBay, 46 RAND J. ECON.
891, 891 (2015).
173. Id. at 910.
174. Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market
Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. 469, 469 (2013).
175. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Leonard, David I. Levine & Laura Giuliano, Customer
Discrimination, 92 REV. ECON. & STAT. 670, 670 (2010).
176. Brian, Would You Hide That Your Business Is Black-Owned To Achieve More Success?,
BLACK BUS. BOOST, https://www.blackbusinessboost.com/would-you-hide-that-your-business-isblack-owned-to-achieve-more-success [https://perma.cc/3MZN-VR7Y].
177. Cheryl V. Jackson, When Building Your Business Means Hiding That It’s Black-Owned,
CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 14, 2016, 5:25 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/blue-sky/ct-blackentrepreneurs-downplay-ownership-bsi-20160414-story.html [https://perma.cc/75LW-3LP7].
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conduct job interviews in assembling his white sales team.”178
Draughon’s story is hardly unusual.179
In iHeartRadio’s popular Black Entrepreneur Blueprint, a
podcast “created specifically to educate and inspire Black
entrepreneurs to Launch[,] Build, and Grow successful businesses,”180
host Jay Jones explains why he—as a self-described “Black dude with
[a] bald head”—operates his e-commerce business selling high-end
hair products through an anonymous company: to compete on an equal
footing based on the quality of his products, rather than his race or
appearance.181 Providing a guide for his listeners in keeping ownership
information anonymous, Jones notes:
[I]ncorporate in a state like Delaware where members of any LLC
can stay anonymous. . . . [A]ny company you create you can be
anonymous. So you can create an LLC, ABC LLC, who are the
members of that LLC? They’re anonymous. So if anybody was trying
to dig and do some research, they won’t be able to find out who are
the owners or the members of that LLC. So you can incorporate in
Delaware, and that’s why a lot of companies do that.182

In a Zoom interview conducted for this study, Jones emphasized
that the use of anonymous companies is “very common in the Black
community.”183 According to Jones, for many Black owners,
“anonymity can serve as credibility.”184 For instance, Jones cited a
friend, Darryl, who operated a cleaning service business of residential
homes through an anonymous LLC structure.185 Cognizant of racial
biases among his own clients, Darryl concealed his ownership: “Darryl

178. Id.
179. In Wisconsin, for instance, Black business owners have reportedly hired white
employees to engage in negotiations after “not [being] able to obtain or rent a property site” due
to their race. See Michael Bonds, Looking Beyond the Numbers: The Struggles of Black Businesses
To Survive: A Qualitative Approach, 37 J. BLACK STUD. 581, 588 (2007).
180. Black Entrepreneur Blueprint, To Be or Not To Be a Black Owned Business; That Is the
Question, IHEART RADIO, at 0:05–:35 (July 30, 2018), https://www.iheart.com/podcast/263-blackentrepreneur-bluepr-27628674/episode/black-entrepreneur-blueprint-211-jay-29645392 [https://perma.cc/
7V8G-CVXW].
181. Id. at 21:15–22:15, 27:02–:30.
182. Id. at 25:39–26:14.
183. Zoom Interview by William J. Moon and Leah Higgins with Jay Jones, at 9:01–9:04
(Sept. 9, 2021).
184. Id. at 35:35–:39 (Jones assessing that “the credibility factor is going to come from
anonymity”).
185. Id. at 11:39–12:50, 14:40–:50.
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had to not be the owner of his business, in order to get business from
other ethnicities—he was the worker, not the owner . . . .”186
The use of anonymous companies by Black entrepreneurs, of
course, is not an observation concerning its normative desirability. One
might rightfully argue that it should not be this way: that race, gender,
or sexual orientation ought not to matter in the market for goods and
services.187 My observation here is rather descriptive: entrepreneurs in
certain industries are constrained by their immutable traits from fully
and fairly participating in today’s commercial life, and many of them
choose anonymity to combat this reality.188 Identity shielding thus
provides Black entrepreneurs the option to compete in a marketplace
infected with racial biases more equitably.189

186. Id. at 12:33–:45.
187. One might also argue that identity shielding may have the potential to entrench
discriminatory norms. In a fascinating piece, Professors Ben Edwards and Ann McGinley
document how female entrepreneurs in the venture capital world “strategically conceal facets of
their female identities in favor of presenting masculinized identities to conduct business and raise
capital.” Edwards & McGinley, supra note 100. Professors Edwards and McGinley further
caution that “yielding to pressures to perform their entities in particular ways, women leave
discriminatory norms unchallenged.” Id. at 1910–11. Yet, a simple ban on identity shielding not
only unfairly penalizes individuals with immutable traits currently dealt with vastly unequal
hands, but it also undermines the ability for individuals in marginalized groups to access
opportunities to gain wealth that too can challenge market biases. Edwards and McGinley explain
that “[t]he costs of resisting social pressures and unjust gender expectations may be too great to
force onto the shoulders of individuals seeking access to economic and social resources.” Id. The
normative desirability of identity shielding’s value, at least in part, depends on one’s assessment
of the optimal ways to combat market inequities, as well as judgment calls about whose
perspective ought to count in rendering those assessments.
188. To be clear, anonymous companies do not constitute the only vehicles chosen by Black
entrepreneurs. According to noted branding expert Sheila P. Coates, the preference to identify
one’s business as Black-owned depends on the person: “There are some Black owners who
wouldn’t dare take their faces off their products. It’s who they are[,] and they would prefer to
succeed doing it their way than hide who they are. It may take longer but it’s who they are as a
brand. Bold. Strong, [sic] and outgoing.” Ann Brown, Hide & Seek: Why Some Companies Hide
Being Black or Woman Owned, MADAME NOIRE (July 28, 2016), https://madamenoire.com/
708037/black-owned [https://perma.cc/BH6F-FXK2] (quoting Sheila P. Coates).
189. In recent years, the Black Lives Matter movement inspired supporters to identify and
support Black-owned businesses. See, e.g., Dylan Haas, How To Find and Support Black-Owned
Businesses—And Why It’s Important, MASHABLE (June 18, 2020), https://mashable.com/
article/how-to-find-and-support-black-owned-businesses [https://perma.cc/M3K3-XR43]. While
these movements should be lauded in helping combat market inequities, it remains to be seen
whether they can fully remedy deep structural inequalities. In some respects, identity shielding
preserves the option for entrepreneurs themselves, who might be at the best informational
advantage to determine optimal strategy to effectively compete in the marketplace. Jay Jones, for
instance, readily admits that he deploys anonymous companies for some but not all of his
businesses because he is cognizant that he does not face discrimination in all contexts. Zoom
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In addition to the individual entrepreneurs from socially
marginalized groups who may benefit from anonymous companies,
there may be other socially desirable dimensions to harnessing identity
shielding in this context. This is because it is arguably a quasi-market
failure when consumers or business partners make business decisions
based not on the quality of the enterprise’s product,190 but rather based
on the immutable traits of the owners, whether race, gender, or sexual
orientation. By stripping away these variables, anonymity forces the
quality of product or service to function as the principal component for
competition, thereby arguably more broadly benefiting the market.191
C. Reducing the Risk of Harassment, Violence, and Stalking
In the United States, one in four women and nearly half of
transgender people experience intimate partner violence.192 Financial
abuse occurs almost invariably in these intimate partner violence
cases.193 Unfortunately, survivors encounter many barriers in leaving
their abusers, including financial insecurity, homelessness,

Interview with Jay Jones, supra note 184, at 4:55–8:48 (acknowledging that he is “unapologetically
Black” in running his podcast and hot sauce company yet deploys anonymous structures for his
beauty business). It is also worth noting that identity shielding can coexist in a world full of social
movements aimed at supporting minority-owned businesses, given that it does not require a legal
regime that mandates anonymity.
190. Cf. David Lowery, Consumer Sovereignty and Quasi-Market Failure, 7 J. PUB. ADMIN.
RSCH. & THEORY 137, 137 (1998) (articulating the concept of consumer preference error as a
quasi-market failure). Rica Elysee, who created the illusion that her beauty product business was
not Black-owned, explains: “We have [C]aucasian clients that work with us but have no idea we
are a [B]lack-owned business. The quality of our products is about the quality of the products, it’s
not about race so I don’t want to use race to build my success.” Lisa Jean Francois, Do BlackOwned Businesses Fare Better When They Conceal Their Blackness?, BGLH MARKETPLACE
(May 13, 2016), https://bglh-marketplace.com/2016/05/do-black-owned-business-fare-betterwhen-they-conceal-their-blackness [https://perma.cc/Z5N3-RT9X].
191. As Professor Calo teaches us, “[p]rivacy supports the basic market mechanism by hiding
enough distracting, value-laden information from market participants. A certain absence of
knowledge focuses us on market-relevant considerations such as quality and price over salient but
distorting information such as personal or political commitments.” Calo, supra note 81.
192. AMY DURRENCE, KIRKLEY DOYLE & SONYA PASSI, ASSET FUNDERS NETWORK,
MAKING SAFETY AFFORDABLE: INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IS AN ASSET-BUILDING ISSUE
3 (2020), https://assetfunders.org/wp-content/uploads/AFN_2020_MakingSafetyAffordable_
SINGLE_9_22_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/S4L6-BXGC]; see Wesley M. King, Arjee Restar &
Don Operario, Exploring Multiple Forms of Intimate Partner Violence in a Gender and
Racially/Ethnically Diverse Sample of Transgender Adults, 1 J. INTERPERS. VIOLENCE NP10477,
NP10478 (2019).
193. See Adrienne E. Adams, Cris M. Sullivan, Deborah Bybee & Megan R. Greeson,
Development of the Scale of Economic Abuse, 14 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 563, 563 (2008).
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unsupportive police, and privacy vulnerabilities that may cause
stalking or death.194 The abuse does not stop with separation from the
batterer. According to Professor Leigh Goodmark, “batterers continue
to stalk their victims—and in many cases, increase their violence—after
separation.”195
Financial freedom is thus critical for victims to gain independence
from intimate partner violence, but it is difficult to achieve. Survivors
of intimate partner violence generally refrain from actively engaging in
social media, posting job pursuits, or advertising identifiable
information that may enable their abusers to find them.196 Because
many workplaces require going to and remaining in the same place
every day for hours, survivors face an additional barrier to gaining
employment.197
194. See Michael A. Anderson, Paulette Marie Gillig, Marilyn Sitaker, Kathy McCloskey,
Kathleen Malloy & Nancy Grigsby, “Why Doesn’t She Just Leave?”: A Descriptive Study of Victim
Reported Impediments to Her Safety, 18 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 151, 152–53 (2003) (discussing reasons
to remain or return as reported by victims); KATRINA BAUM, SHANNAN CATALANO, MICHAEL
RAND & KRISTINA ROSE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. SPECIAL REP., STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN
THE UNITED STATES 3 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/
08/15/bjs-stalking-rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETC7-M837] (citing that the risk of stalking
victimization was highest for adults who were separated or divorced—thirty-four per one
thousand individuals); Jacquelyn C. Campbell, Daniel Webster, Jane Koziol-McLain, Carolyn
Block, Doris Campbell, Mary Ann Curry, Faye Gary, Nancy Glass, Judith McFarlane, Carolyn
Sachs, Phyllis Sharps, Yvonne Ulrich, Susan A. Wilt, Jennifer Manganello, Xiao Xu, Janet
Schollenberger, Victoria Frye & Kathryn Laughon, Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive
Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1090
(2003) (finding that having been separated from an abusive partner after living together, and
having ever left or having asked the partner to leave were associated with a higher risk of
femicide).
195. Leigh Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the
Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004); see
also Dana Harrington Conner, Financial Freedom: Women, Money, and Domestic Abuse, 20 WM.
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 339, 340 (2014) (“[F]inancial instability is one of the greatest reasons
why, after gaining freedom, a woman who experiences battering has limited choices and may
ultimately acquiesce to her partner’s attempts to reconcile.”).
196. Cf. Domestic Violence and Privacy, ELEC. PRIV. INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/dv
[https://perma.cc/2UMU-625X] (“[D]omestic violence victims are . . . singled out by a particular
aggressor. This aggressor is able to take advantage of the general lack of protection for personal
information in our society.”).
197. See, e.g., Devna Bose, ‘Don’t Let Them Take Your Voice Away’: Domestic Violence
Survivors Face Voting Challenges, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.charlotte
observer.com/news/politics-government/election/article246265510.html [https://perma.cc/D2W4C74X] (finding that similar privacy concerns arise in voting, where survivors of domestic violence
are hesitant to register to vote because voting records are public information). Compounding this
problem is the reality that traditional employment can be inaccessible to survivors. As Amy
Durrence and her colleagues assess, “[s]urvivors have any number of issues that require attention
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Anonymous companies have emerged as a critical tool for
survivors of intimate partner violence to regain their financial
independence through entrepreneurship. Although the secretive
nature of these enterprises renders these entrepreneurs difficult to
document, several telephone interviews conducted for this study help
shed light on this practice.
In a telephone interview, Larry Donahue, a law firm partner
specializing in forming anonymous LLCs,198 discussed the colorful
spectrum of survivors that have entered commercial life by forming
anonymous companies:
There’s the traditional, former wife who was abused and battered and
finally left and moved to another area of the United States and started
over with her business. But then I have other abuse victims [like] a
daughter who was horribly abused by her father and started her own
company without her father being able to look her up and see where
she’s at. . . . The more common stuff isn’t outright abuse like that.
There’s a lot of stalking victims who are trying to do business . . .
without opening themselves up to further stalking or problems like
that.199

These survivor-entrepreneurs engage in a wide array of
commercial activities, including selling home-produced goods on
Amazon and Etsy to providing services like educational training.
Consider the story of an intimate partner violence survivor in her
thirties, referred to by the pseudonym Ann, who fled her abuser after
being terrorized by years of constant stalking.200 After moving to a
different state, Ann set up a consulting business that she operated
through her home. In a telephone interview, Ann revealed that she
deliberately set up an LLC that listed a P.O. Box address instead of her
home address to ensure that her abuser could not track her.201

during normal business hours (e.g., court appearances) or issues that are so urgent that they
require a survivor to miss work (e.g., going to the hospital to treat injuries and wounds), thus
making their schedules unpredictable and inconsistent.” DURRENCE ET AL., supra note 192, at 8.
198. See Telephone Interview with Larry Donahue, supra note 46.
199. Id.
200. See Telephone Interview with an Anonymous Intimate Partner Violence Survivor (June
29, 2021) (notes on file with author).
201. See id. Interestingly, Ann did disclose her actual name when forming her LLC, only
choosing not to reveal her home address by providing a P.O. Box. Id. Ann’s LLC constitutes a
breed of quasi-anonymous LLCs that do not fully anonymize an entrepreneur’s association with
the enterprise. She attributed this structure to her lack of knowledge that it would have been
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According to Ann, abuse victims “cannot afford to locate themselves
publicly and getting a job is super tricky because you may not be able
to stay put and you might have to flee again.”202 Her story conforms to
what advocacy organizations have identified as nontraditional work
including “selling beauty products online via Etsy or Shopify” as viable
paths for survivors to create pathways to financial security.203
While not necessarily immutable traits, survivors of intimate
partner violence represent a group of individuals who are constrained
by their personal circumstances—whether religious, social, or familybased constraints—from effectively engaging in business enterprises
without some assurance of anonymity. To many of these individuals,
identity shielding offered by the corporate form is often a more
important feature than limited liability or entity shielding in their
ability to engage in entrepreneurial risk-taking.
*

*

*

To recap, the concept of identity shielding complicates the
dominant account in modern corporate law scholarship
conceptualizing business entities as transactional cost-reducing
devices.204 This literature, which tends to conceptualize business risks
in terms of the loss of capital, is animated in large parts by
disagreements about the extent to which the cost of business failure
ought to be borne by capital contributors.205 In reality, however,
business ventures require more than just money. The ability of capital
contributors to maintain privacy when investing in business ventures
also powerfully impacts the propensity of individuals to take on
entrepreneurial risk. For some capital contributors, identity shielding

possible to even form a fully anonymous structure and indicated that she would have opted for
full anonymity if she was more fully informed.
202. See id.
203. DURRENCE ET AL., supra note 192, at 8.
204. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, Essential Role, supra note 12, at 406 (“In the absence
of organizational law, it would be effectively impossible to create the affirmative asset partitioning
that is the core characteristic of a legal entity. While . . . affirmative asset partitioning might still
be established through contracting, the transaction costs . . . would be prohibitive.”).
205. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Limited Liability and the Efficient Allocation of Resources,
89 NW. U. L. REV. 140, 143 (1994); Leebron, supra note 145, at 1570–71. Commonly cited in this
impressive body of literature is Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel’s six traditional
justifications for limited liability, which focus on the economic benefits of limited liability. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 22, at 89.
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may be a more important feature of the corporate form even than
limited liability or entity shielding due to their individual circumstances
or the type of business in which they are engaged. Separate from
funding morally contentious enterprises, there are vast swaths of
enterprises that would otherwise not exist without some assurance of
anonymity for capital contributors.206 Practically, explicitly theorizing
identity shielding as a function of modern business entities enables
more nuanced policy discussions about regulating anonymous
companies. The next Part engages with the thorny policy questions in
this important debate.
III. TOWARD SENSIBLE ENTERPRISE PRIVACY LAWS
This Article has thus far identified the privacy functions served by
anonymous companies—functions that encourage entrepreneurial
risk-taking and human collaboration. Appreciating identity shielding
as a function of the corporate form not only enriches existing academic
accounts concerning the function of business entities but also enables
a fresh outlook on balancing the legitimate societal interests in
preserving anonymity and the need to curb illicit activities facilitated
by anonymous shell companies. This Part unpacks how we may balance
those interests. Section III.A synthesizes the rapidly shifting landscape
of business ownership disclosure laws currently underway worldwide,
including the CTA in the United States enacted by Congress in 2021.
These reform efforts, while well-intentioned, often fail to give weight
to the privacy interests of individuals involved in legitimate commercial
enterprises. Section III.B elaborates on the value tradeoffs involving
mandatory disclosure laws and discusses the possibility of “semi-

206. Anonymity also protects investment in ventures from targeted exploitation by
competitors or other investors. This principle, of course, is already recognized in the laws
governing investments in U.S. public companies. That is, there is no duty for the average retail
investor to disclose her ownership of stocks. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The
Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 44 (2012) (“[T]he
general principle [is] that outside investors may remain anonymous.”). Moreover, because most
public company shareholders hold their shares in a street name, anonymity is preserved in this
context. Constantine G. Papavizas, Public Company Jones Act Citizenship, 39 TUL. MAR. L.J. 383,
384 (2015) (“Most publicly traded securities are held in ‘street name’ where the securities issuer
does not have access to the identity of the ultimate owners. . . .” (footnote omitted)). Anonymity
in these circumstances may be beneficial. As explained by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert
Jackson, a mandatory disclosure requirement might “enable other investors to free-ride on . . .
investments in information acquisition about under-valued companies and thus could have an
adverse effect on such investments.” Bebchuk & Jackson, supra, at 45.
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disclosure” regimes that may balance competing interests for and
against anonymity.
A. The Corporate Transparency Act and the Global Trend Toward
Open Registries
The public outcry following the Panama Papers document leaks
galvanized a powerful global movement for legislative reform. Largely
driving the legislative agenda is a well-intentioned fetishization of
transparency among global reformers. To these activists, the promise
of transparency comes at a relatively cheap price tag of maintaining
public registries of company information.207 Fresh on these reformers’
minds are the sensational stories of transnational criminals that deploy
shell companies to commit financial crimes.208
Legislative reform efforts around the world vary, but they share
an outlook in observing the seemingly pernicious nature of actors
choosing to form business entities in jurisdictions with lax disclosure
rules. More specifically, those who are alarmed by anonymous shell
companies thus far have focused on advocating for legislation to create
government registries that collect and disseminate beneficial
ownership information of companies to the general public. At the heart
of these reform efforts is the premise that public registries will enable
“greater scrutiny by investigative journalists and civil society

207. These accounts are often presented as a simple cost-benefit analysis. According to
Global Witness, for instance, “the likely economic benefits of collecting beneficial ownership
information and then making it public outweigh the costs.” Rosie Sharpe, Eight Reasons Why
Everybody Needs To Be Able To See Company Ownership Information (Not Just the Police),
GLOB. WITNESS (June 30, 2016), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/eight-reasons-why-weall-need-be-able-see-beneficial-ownership-information-rather-just-police [https://perma.cc/7MX3V6V2]. Global Witness also notes that,
[I]ncluding beneficial ownership information in a register that is searchable and
updated as ownership changes would cost the UK government £11m a year (with an
initial outlay of £0.5m to set up)[,] and for the UK private sector, the costs would be
£4m a year (with an initial outlay of £24m). The 2002 study estimated the savings in
police time alone from having a public registry of beneficial ownership to be £30m a
year.
Requiring Beneficial Ownership Information To Be Put in the Public Domain Is Cheap, GLOB.
WITNESS (May 9, 2013), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/howell [https://perma.cc/
XQ5R-C9N2].
208. See J.C. Sharman, Privacy as Roguery: Personal Financial Information in an Age of
Transparency, 87 PUB. ADMIN. 717, 717 (2009) (quoting a policy maker in the area of financial
transparency who said that “[w]here secrecy lies, roguery is not far behind”).
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organisations [that] will help to prevent the abuse of anonymous
companies by the criminal and the corrupt.”209
Europe has been at the forefront of enacting beneficial ownership
statutes. As part of its Anti-Money Laundering Directive
(“AMLD”),210 the European Union (“EU”) requires its member states
to keep central registers on beneficial owners that can be accessed by
authorities and the general public.211 The minimum amount of
information that must be available to the general public includes the
beneficial owner’s name, month and year of birth, country of residence,
nationality, and the nature and extent of the beneficial interest held.212
With implementation in progress, Bulgaria, Denmark, Latvia,
Luxembourg, and Slovenia have already set up free, unrestricted public
registers of the beneficial owners of companies, while Belgium,
Croatia, Portugal, and Sweden have set up public registers that limit
their access to citizens and residents of European nations.213 The EU’s
efforts follow legal reforms undertaken by the United Kingdom, which
in 2016 became one of the first nations in the world to enact a public
registry of business entities.214
Europe has had success influencing other nations to enact similar
reform.215 In order to address concerns raised by the EU Code of

209. Patchy Progress in Setting Up Beneficial Ownership Registers in the EU, GLOB. WITNESS
(Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter GLOB. WITNESS, Patchy Progress], https://www.globalwitness.org/
en/campaigns/corruption-and-money-laundering/anonymous-company-owners/5amld-patchyprogress [https://perma.cc/A7TM-BS8S].
210. Council Directive 2018/843, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (EU).
211. See id. The fifth AMLD expands access to information in the beneficial ownership
registers to include “any member of the general public” in addition to competent authorities and
obliged entities. See id. § 30(5). Failure to comply with the AMLD may result in public reprimand,
cease and desist orders, suspension of authorization, a temporary ban from managerial function,
a maximum sanction in the amount of double the benefit derived from the breach, or a fine of at
least one million euros. Council Directive 2015/849, ch. VI, § 4, art. 59, 156/43, 2015 O.J. (L 141),
57–58 (EU).
212. Council Directive 2015/849, ch. III, art. 30, 156/43, 2015 O.J. (L 141) (EU); Council
Directive 2018/843, 156/43, 2018 O.J. (L 156) (EU).
213. GLOB. WITNESS, Patchy Progress, supra note 209.
214. In the United Kingdom, ownership of business entities on the register “is made freely
available by the UK’s Companies House both as a searchable web interface as well as structured
data in machine-readable format.” OPENOWNERSHIP & GLOB. WITNESS, supra note 37, at 3.
215. This is, of course, not the first time Europe has set the global standard for regulation.
See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (assessing that “the EU
has a strong and growing ability to promulgate regulations that become entrenched in the legal
frameworks of developed and developing markets alike, leading to a notable ‘Europeanization’
of many important aspects of global commerce”).
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Conduct Group, a number of offshore jurisdictions have introduced
“substance” rules for companies that carry on certain activities in their
jurisdictions.216 With new laws adopted in 2019, corporations formed in
Guernsey, the Cayman Islands, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda,
the Isle of Man, and Jersey will be forced to demonstrate territorial
nexus to the incorporating jurisdiction.217 While permutations are
endless, these laws also require the disclosure of business owners to
relevant government agencies.218
Europe’s approach has also been influential in shaping the
legislative agenda in the United States.219 On January 1, 2021, Congress
passed the CTA and set it to take effect in 2023.220 The Act requires
reporting companies to submit a report to the Department of Treasury
identifying each beneficial owner of corporations, LLCs, and other
similar entities that are formed or registered to do business in the
United States.221 Beneficial owners, which the CTA defines broadly,222
must file a report providing their full legal name, date of birth, and
address.223
The CTA does not mandate public disclosure. But reform activists
insist that a European-style open registry must be enacted into law in

216. Simon Goldring, The Economic Substance Requirement, NAT’L REV. (July 9, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/economic-substance-requirements [https://perma.cc/6FTUXBEQ].
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., MOURANT, BVI BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP LEGISLATION 1–2 (2019),
https://www.mourant.com/file-library/media—-2019/2019—-guides/bvi-beneficial-ownership-legi
slation-(dec-19-update).pdf [https://perma.cc/D2Z7-4MR8].
219. See Harold Adrion, The New Corporate Transparency Act Will Require Reporting of
Beneficial Ownership of Many U.S. Companies, LLCs and Foreign Companies Registered To Do
Business in the U.S., EISNERAMPER LLP (Feb. 8, 2021) (“The U.S. has been under significant
pressure to create and conform a corporate registry to what exists in the European Union (‘EU’).
All 28 countries in the EU are now required to have corporate registries that include beneficial
ownership information.”).
220. Corporate Transparency Act, Pub. L. No. 116-283, §§ 6401–6403, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).
221. See 31 U.S.C. § 5336(a)(11)(A), (b)(2).
222. The Act defines “beneficial owner” broadly to include:
[A] natural person who, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement,
understanding, relationship, or otherwise (i) exercises substantial control over a
corporation or limited liability company; (ii) owns 25 percent or more of the equity
interests of a corporation or limited liability company; or (iii) receives substantial
economic benefits from the assets of a corporation or limited liability company.
Id. § 5333(a)(1)(A).
223. Id. § 5336(b)(2)(A).
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the United States.224 Consider the stance taken by the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project, a prominent investigative reporting
platform. While the organization describes the CTA as “a major
legislative milestone in the American fight against kleptocracy,” the
organization considers the work “only half done” and laments “how
much better things could be if the U.S. copied the British model.”225
These efforts have already made progress more locally. In 2018,
Washington, D.C., enacted a law requiring the public disclosure of all
business entities formed in or that do business within the district.226 As
of January 1, 2020, the law mandates the disclosure of the names and
addresses of each person who directly or indirectly has an ownership
stake exceeding 10 percent of the firm.227 Lawmakers in New York
have recently introduced a similar bill that would require the public
disclosure of beneficial owners of LLCs.228
Intellectually, the proclivity toward ownership transparency owes
its scholarly debt to academics writing in the law and economics
tradition who have long been skeptical of privacy.229 This proclivity is

224. Advocacy organizations typically tout the U.K.’s public registrar as “[a] model of best
practice,” assessing that “the UK has set standards for what a good register of beneficial
ownership look like that should be replicated.” OPENOWNERSHIP & GLOB. WITNESS, supra note
37, at 4.
225. Ann Marlowe, Time for a Free Public Registry of Corporate Beneficial Ownership in the
U.S., OCCRP (Jan. 2021), https://www.occrp.org/en/37-ccblog/ccblog/13722-opinion-time-for-afree-public-registry-of-corporate-beneficial-ownership-in-the-u-s [https://perma.cc/V6PN-MKLQ].
The logic here is drawn straight from advocacy organizations that romanticize transparency. For
instance, the Hudson Institute assesses that transparency would force “‘sleazeballs and rip-off
artists’ flocking to the United States . . . [to] uproot and look elsewhere rather than allow their
networks of American-based shell companies to see the light of day.” HUDSON INST., UNITED
STATES OF ANONYMITY 32 (2017).
226. See D.C. CODE §§ 29-102.01, 29-102.11 (2021).
227. Hunter M. Haines, Understanding Entity Disclosure Requirements Under DCRA’s
Amended Entity Filing Law, SHULMAN ROGERS (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.shulman
rogers.com/news-events/understanding-entity-disclosure-requirements-under-dcras-amendedentity-filing-law [https://perma.cc/J79H-B8UQ].
228. S. 2255, 2019 Leg., 242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“The department of state shall establish and
maintain a database identifying beneficial owners by name and current residential or business
street address. . . . Such database shall be made available to the public. . . .”).
229. As Professor Calo observes, “[M]any economists see privacy as harming markets by
removing information.” Ryan Calo, Privacy Law’s Indeterminacy, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
L. 33, 44 (2019); see also Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2382 (1996) (“[T]he consensus of the law and
economics literature is this: more information is better, and restrictions on the flow of information
in the name of privacy are generally not social wealth maximizing, because they inhibit
decisionmaking, increase transaction costs, and encourage fraud.”).
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hardly surprising given that many economists and legal scholars have
long romanticized markets with perfect information.230 Judge Richard
Posner, for instance, conceptualizes privacy as a means for market
actors to take advantage of others through selectively hiding germane
information.231 Within this academic paradigm, unfettered public
access of information ought to result in better market transactions for
all. Reformers take a page from this academic tradition. Shining light
on these transactions will supposedly serve as the antidote, helping
detect and deter illicit activities. Indeed, reformers often tout that
“[t]he free market works best when all parties have full access to
information.”232
While undoubtedly well-intentioned, reform efforts advocating
unfettered public access of private ownership information have not yet
been subject to serious intellectual pressure. The next Section aims to
address this shortcoming by identifying the true costs of instituting
mandatory public disclosure regimes.
B. Toward A More Nuanced Policy Framework for Enterprise
Transparency
Open registries mandating full-throttled ownership disclosures do
not necessarily result in bad policy or assault fundamental values that
may be embedded in longstanding constitutional law doctrines. In
some societies, the needs of government enforcement agencies or the
simple desire by society to probe and monitor private businesses may
outweigh the interests advanced by identity shielding. More broadly,
normative assessments in this area are value tradeoffs that speak to
broader questions about the kind of society one desires to live in—
questions that are not easily reducible to a singular policy prescription.
At the very least, however, the costs associated with open registries
ought to be recognized beyond just the administrative costs associated
with building and maintaining disclosure registries. Unfortunately, the
subtle yet real costs of transparency are not fully appreciated as
tradeoffs in today’s policy debate. Moreover, the purported benefits of
230. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMMC’NS ACM 92, 97 (1996).
231. See Posner, supra note 84 (“Often people want privacy in order to manipulate other
people by concealing from them aspects of their character, prospects, or past that would if known
reduce their opportunities to engage in advantageous market or nonmarket transactions.”).
232. Sharpe, supra note 207. Advocates of open registry also tout that a public registry can
“enhance accuracy by allowing users of the data—be they private sector, civil society, or public
sector—to review and report errors in the data.” OPENOWNERSHIP & GLOB. WITNESS, supra
note 37, at 3.
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mandatory disclosure regimes cannot be taken for granted, given that
they often operate under tenuous assumptions that those engaged in
illicit activities would voluntarily report their ownership information.
This Section highlights the range of policy considerations that
ought to be weighed by any given society before instituting disclosure
laws that effectively ban identity shielding. Specifically, this Section
elaborates on the true costs of mandatory public disclosure regimes for
policymakers in order to develop a richer understanding of their
necessary tradeoffs, and it explores the potential for semi-disclosure
regimes that may enable us to capture some of the benefits of identity
shielding while simultaneously minimizing the harms inflicted by
anonymous shell companies. While some of these issues implicate
constitutional dimensions that also weigh against open access
regimes,233 this Section focuses on policy tradeoffs, recognizing that the
demands of constitutional minimums vary widely by jurisdiction,234 and

233. For instance, in the United States, preserving the ability of individuals to pool resources
to fund and operate businesses that promote certain political beliefs or associational interests is
laden with constitutional principles. In the seminal case of NAACP v. Alabama, the Supreme
Court held unconstitutional Alabama’s mandatory disclosure regime making the group’s
membership list accessible, given that such disclosure entails “the likelihood of a substantial
restraint upon the exercise by petitioner’s members of their right to freedom of association.”
Pollman, Corporate, supra note 20, at 81 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 462 (1958)). U.S. constitutional law also recognizes the right to informational privacy—a
limited right to avoid the public disclosure of personal information. As Professors David Gray
and Danielle Keats Citron recounted:
In Whalen v. Roe, a 1977 case involving New York’s mandatory collection of
prescription drug records, the Supreme Court strongly suggested that the Constitution
contains a right to information privacy based on substantive due process. Although it
held that New York’s prescription drug database did not violate the constitutional right
to privacy because the gathered information was adequately secured, the Court
recognized an ‘individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 74 (2013)
(quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 589–600 (1977)). Jurisprudence in this area, however, is
murky at best. As Professor Skinner-Thompson assesses, “the Supreme Court has failed to
definitively recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy in favor of reluctantly
assuming (without deciding) that such a right exists on three occasions, most recently in 2011.”
Skinner-Thompson, supra note 101, at 163.
234. See MICHAEL HENRY, INTERNATIONAL PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND PERSONALITY
LAWS 1 (Michael Henry ed., 2001); Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE LAW 1193, 1193 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2019).
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that legislation is principally driven by complex policy considerations
that may not be entirely captured in constitutional analyses.235
1. The Promise and Pitfalls of Public Ownership Registries. The
global movement toward beneficial ownership disclosure laws has
largely been premised on the observation that anonymous shell
companies “are the single greatest obstacle to fighting money
laundering and other financial crimes.”236 Demands for action deluge
lawmakers particularly in the aftermaths of massive document leaks
that capture the public’s attention. Disclosure laws appear to come to
the rescue, addressing real and important problems of deterring illicit
activities and grand-scale financial fraud. Currently, policy is driven
principally by the desire to curb shell companies that facilitate illicit
activities, even though “most shell companies are used for legitimate
business purposes.”237
This does not mean that public disclosure laws lack any value.
Registries with accurate information available—public or not—to
relevant government enforcement agencies can better equip law
enforcement to detect and tackle complex financial crimes. According
to an FBI deputy assistant director, “[t]he burden of uncovering true
beneficial owners can often handicap or delay investigations,
frequently requiring duplicative, slow-moving legal process in several
jurisdictions to gain the necessary information.”238 The ability to easily
identify the true owners of shell companies, therefore, “would allow
the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to quickly and efficiently

235. Business entities do not implicate constitutional concerns because corporations are
persons in the sense that they closely resemble natural humans. Instead, as Professor Pollman
eloquently puts it,
[C]orporations do not receive rights because the characteristics of the entity so closely
resemble a natural human so as to merit granting the right; rather corporations receive
rights because, as forms of organizing human enterprise, they have natural persons
involved in them, and sometimes it is necessary to accord protection to the corporation
to protect their interests.
Pollman, Corporate, supra note 20, at 52.
236. J.C. SHARMAN, THE MONEY LAUNDRY: REGULATING CRIMINAL FINANCE IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 74 (2011).
237. FINDLEY, NIELSON & SHARMAN, supra note 5, at 33.
238. Combatting Illicit Financing by Anonymous Shell Companies: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urb. Affs., 116th Cong. 33 (2019) (statement of Acting Deputy
Assistant Director Steven M. D’Antuono, Criminal Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation).
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mitigate the threats posed by the illicit movement of the succeeding
funds.”239
At least in theory, registries accessible by the general public come
with the added benefit of enabling private citizens to detect and
enforce violations of law. Government agencies often suffer from
limited resources to detect and enforce laws.240 In some cases, private
citizens might also have the informational advantage to detect
fraudulent activities.241 For instance, publicly available civil court
proceedings initiated by a bank against a Kazakh ex-banker revealed
“hundreds of offshore companies, extended corporate services supply
chains, multiple nominee directors, and successive ostensible ‘ultimate
beneficial owners.’”242 Private litigation in the United States routinely
reveals more information about shell companies as well.243
Aside from combatting outright illicit activities, the disclosure
mantra—that more information is better than less244—may in some
cases enable people to make better decisions while shaming socially
undesirable business practices. Identity shielding has a flip side,
although not necessarily symmetrical in its function. Forced public
disclosure may enable consumers to better exercise their purse power
by punishing local business crooks who pollute the environment or
enterprises that engage in unsavory labor practices. The threat of bad
publicity, at least in theory, can thus shame certain actors from
239. Id.
240. See William J. Moon, Contracting Out of Public Law, 55 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 361
(2018) (“[P]ublic enforcement is often inadequate because of resource constraints endemic in
administrative agencies.”); Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1072, 1073 (1969) (“[I]t is expected that private treble damages litigation in the antitrust
field . . . will insure some minimal deterrent against local and not too flagrant violations of law
which the public enforcement agencies, because of limited resources, would almost certainly
ignore . . . .”).
241. See J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public
Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1154 (2012); see also Matthew C. Stephenson, Public
Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding the Role of Administrative Agencies,
91 VA. L. REV. 93, 95–96 (2005) (arguing that private litigants in the United States play an
important role in “deterring, detecting, and correcting socially harmful violations of the law”).
242. Delphine Nougayrède, The Use of Offshore Companies in Emerging Market Economies:
A Case Study, 23 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 401, 401 (2017).
243. See, e.g., Bootay v. KBR, Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1241, 2010 WL 3632720, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 9, 2010) (“Plaintiff alleges the over-use of corporate formalities, by emphasizing repeatedly
that Overseas and SEII were ‘shell companies’ with no business or assets of their own, which were
set up in the Cayman Islands to avoid United States taxes.” (emphasis omitted)).
244. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 651 (2011).
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operating what many might view as morally reprehensible enterprises.
Consider, for instance, landlord-tenant relationships. Advocates of
transparency in real estate ownership in the United States argue that
public records “facilitate[] the enforcement of tenant rights . . . [while
preventing] abuse and landlord negligence.”245 From businesses
operated by white supremacists to businesses that engage in
anticompetitive activities, morally reprehensible businesses may be
endless.246 Finally, similar to how limited liability can be a source of
moral hazard,247 identity shielding can do the same, at least
theoretically, by reducing the reputational costs involved in risky
business ventures.
But policy ought not to be dictated by the intuitive yet relatively
untested premise that mandatory disclosure laws effectively serve as
the proper antidote to curbing illicit or nefarious activities. The
baseline question that ought to be investigated further is whether and
to what extent disclosure laws meaningfully accomplish their intended
goals. This is particularly true because mandated disclosure in other
contexts have largely failed to achieve their intended goals. According
to Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider’s wide-ranging
study of mandatory disclosure laws in contexts ranging from financial
transactions to healthcare and insurance, mandated disclosure “not
only fails to achieve its stated goal but also leads to unintended
consequences that often harm the very people it intends to serve.”248
Even in the world where the regulations achieve some of their
objectives, their efficacy ought to be weighed against their tradeoffs:

245. D. Victoria Baranetsky, Op-Ed: You Should Have the Right To Know Your Landlord’s
Name, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2021, 3:10 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-0224/rental-housing-shell-companies-landlords [https://perma.cc/4CDZ-V629]. Identity shielding
can also make it more difficult for plaintiffs to pursue veil piercing litigation. To the extent that
veil piercing—as the general exception to the doctrine of limited liability—is deemed to be
desirable (a contested point), this factor can weigh against preserving identity shielding.
246. Anonymity, for example, may undermine the ability of consumers to boycott businesses
like Publix Supermarkets, whose heiress allegedly partly provided funding “used to incite the
deadly Capitol attack.” Lauren Sue, ‘Enough’: Publix Heiress Funds Trump Rally and Worker
Denied Right To Wear Mask Dies of COVID-19, DAILY KOS (Feb. 15, 2021, 12:42 PM),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2021/2/15/2016211/—Not-going-to-call-this-normal-Publix-heiressgives-300K-for-Trump-rally-ending-in-Capitol-riot [https://perma.cc/QFT2-SYL5].
247. Marie-Laure Djelic & Joel Bothello, Limited Liability and Its Moral Hazard
Implications: The Systemic Inscription of Instability in Contemporary Capitalism, 42 THEORY &
SOC. 589, 589 (2013). Moral hazard refers to “the opportunity for organizational and individual
actors to reap rewards of risky behavior without bearing associated costs.” Id.
248. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 244, at 647.
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the costs of building and maintaining registries, compliance costs, along
with the lost benefits of identity shielding.
A glaring issue underlying any mandatory disclosure regime is that
it requires those engaged in fraudulent, nefarious, and illicit activities—
money launderers, tax evaders, and drug traffickers—to self-report
information on beneficial ownership registries. Those who engage in
unsavory or illicit behavior are precisely those more inclined to dodge
compliance.249 According to one commentator, transparency bills
aimed at curbing fraud often fail because “those targets would also be
the most likely to frustrate the purposes of the [law] by committing
fraud in their reporting of beneficial ownership information.”250
This is, of course, not to say that laws cannot be designed to
compel or incentivize compliance. The effectiveness of disclosure laws
necessarily depends on a host of variables, including the specific design
of the law’s penalties, exceptions, and enforcement. Rather, it is an
observation that an unintended consequence of mandatory disclosure
may be that the costs are borne disproportionality by law-abiding,
small-business owners who are forced to give up anonymity and incur
compliance costs.
Even operating under the optimistic assumption that owners and
investors of enterprises will faithfully attempt to comply with
disclosure mandates, these disclosure regimes still face other issues that
potentially hinder them from achieving their intended goals. First,
loopholes abound in any disclosure regime that must define the scope
and targets of disclosure, incentivizing sophisticated actors to deploy
resources to evade regulation—even in a world where disclosers
faithfully comply with laws on the books.251 Consider, for instance, the
249. As Professor Richard Gordon explains:
I find it difficult to believe that plain vanilla money launders won’t be able to
persuade—through fraud, threat, or compensation—people who appear honest to
approach service providers to set up and “own” companies, whether shell or otherwise,
on behalf of the bad guys. While investigators would find it useful for corporation
service providers to record the identity of the physical person who set up a company . . .
I think efforts are better made at the level of the financial institution.
See Richard Gordon, A Tale Of Two Studies: The Real Story Of Terrorism Finance, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 269, 280 (2014).
250. See J.W. Verret, Terrorism Finance, Business Associations, and the “Incorporation
Transparency Act”, 70 LA. L. REV. 857, 861 (2010).
251. See, e.g., Lill Marie Martinez Cruz, After the Panama Papers. . . A More Transparent
Corporate Business Model?, 33 ASIAN J. LATIN AM. STUD. 135, 141 (2020) (“Instead of
facilitating the detection of illegalities by raising red flag alerts, AMLR [anti-money laundering
regulation] has simply encouraged an ‘increase in the complexity of ML [money laundering]
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United Kingdom’s ownership disclosure law that requires the
disclosure of owners of entities who directly or indirectly hold a 25
percent share of the company. As bluntly put by one commentator,
“[T]he 25% threshold set for disclosure is meaningless, as criminals can
easily arrange to hold less than that to evade reporting.”252 This is far
from a theoretical problem. Former Kazakh minister Mukhtar
Ablyazov allegedly laundered $6 billion from BTA Bank using
multiple entities that each held just under 10 percent shares in the bank
because “10 per cent was the disclosure threshold in Kazakhstan at the
time.”253 Then, there are the practical difficulties of building effective
verification mechanisms. The UK’s registry, for example, “merely
accept[s] information from companies and add[s] details to the register;
[but it] is not required to . . . check whether information provided is
accurate.”254
In some respects, evasion of local disclosure laws is predictable in
a world with approximately two hundred sovereign nations—and even
more quasi-sovereign lawmakers with internationally-recognized
lawmaking authority to charter business entities255—as private actors
can shop for business entities in jurisdictions with lax disclosure rules.256
Like a game of whack-a-mole, laws requiring all companies formed in
their jurisdiction to disclose their beneficial owners would simply
incentivize those who seek anonymity to form or reincorporate their
business entities in jurisdictions with lax disclosure rules. This is
because enterprises in many jurisdictions—including the United
States—need not maintain any territorial nexus to their place of
incorporation.257 Even where laws mandate disclosure based on the
location of the enterprise, the nonterritorial nature of modern financial
transactions enable those engaged in sophisticated financial crimes to
schemes.’” (quoting Mohammed Ahmad Naheem, The Agency Dilemma in Anti-Money
Laundering Regulation, 23 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 26, 32 (2020))).
252. Id. at 151.
253. Paul Michael Gilmour, Lifting the Veil on Beneficial Ownership: Challenges of
Implementing the UK’s Registers of Beneficial Owners, 23 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 717,
726 (2020).
254. Id. at 727.
255. See Moon, supra note 58, at 1405 n.6.
256. See id. at 1444.
257. See William J. Moon, Delaware’s Global Competitiveness, 106 IOWA L. REV. 1683, 1699
(2021) (“Today, a number of major jurisdictions around the world allow firms to shop for
corporate law, including Brazil, Canada, China, India, Israel, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States.” (footnotes omitted)).
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easily shift the locus of their operations to evade regulation.258 Again,
small business owners cannot shift their locus of operations easily (for
example, local coffee shops or restaurants that are almost by definition
geographically bound); it is the sophisticated financial criminals who
are more likely able to evade disclosure regulations. At worst, these
kinds of design flaws may deter and discourage productive
entrepreneurship of small business owners, but they do not necessarily
deter sophisticated transnational criminals.
Policymakers ought to factor in opportunity costs as well. Thus far,
the costs associated with mandatory disclosure have principally been
framed as a government expenditure needed to build disclosure
registries. But costs are also borne by private businesses that may need
to hire lawyers to navigate the maze of vague regulations for
compliance.259 Any given resources deployed to build and maintain
disclosure registries—along with the intangible costs of undermining
identity shielding—can be deployed to combat illicit activities more
directly.260 After all, as indicated by the number of successful
indictments brought by the Department of Justice prior to disclosure
laws,261 shell companies do not offer blanket immunity for financial

258. See Moon, supra note 41, at 13 (“Unlike industries that rely on productive activities tied
to an identifiable parcel of territory (think, for instance, automobile manufacturing in Detroit),
financial transactions are legally constituted. Because finance is built and constituted by systems
of rules, the industry need not be territorial at all.” (footnotes omitted)).
259. See Kevin L. Shepherd & Edward M. Manigault, Beneficial Ownership Disclosure and
the Corporate Transparency Act: Overdue or Overwrought?, 35 PROB. & PROP. 49, 49 (2021)
(“The CTA raises many basic questions, such as how it will affect small business and entities
commonly used for business and estate planning, whether law firms will be reporting companies,
and how lawyers will be involved with filing the beneficial ownership reports.”); House Panel
Approves Beneficial Ownership Legislation, A.B.A. (June 19, 2019), https://www.american
bar.org/advocacy/governmental_legislative_work/publications/washingtonletter/June_2019_Was
hington_Letter/gatekeeper_article [https://perma.cc/AG2X-PWE8] (describing an earlier version
of the CTA as a bill “that would impose burdensome and intrusive regulations on millions of small
businesses and their lawyers”).
260. As Professor Richard Gordon explains:
[G]iven that the resources to prevent bad guys from doing bad things are necessarily
finite, shifting resources to initiatives intended to stop terrorists from setting up or
using shell companies necessarily means shifting them from somewhere else. But if that
somewhere else is actually stopping bad guys, and if the assertion that terrorists use
shell companies is false, the result could actually harm antiterrorism efforts.
See Gordon, supra note 249, at 271.
261. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Charlotte Man Charged With Tax
Evasion For Using Shell Companies To Hide Income (June 11, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/us
ao-wdnc/pr/charlotte-man-charged-tax-evasion-using-shell-companies-hide-income [https://perma.cc/
3XT5-SFMM]; Press Release, U.S. Department of Justice, Shell Company Operator Pleads Guilty
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criminals. Finally, any system of disclosure that mandates public
disclosure denies us the benefits of identity shielding.
2. Possibility of Semi-Disclosure Regimes. It is important to note
that identity shielding, as conceptualized in this Article, does not
necessarily require a world where no one knows about the identity of
capital contributors.262 Owners and investors in anonymous companies,
for instance, must still pay applicable federal and state taxes263—all
which necessitate ownership information flowing to government
agencies but not to the general public.264 While information retained by
governments undoubtedly is vulnerable to leaks and abuse,265 that
system still preserves identity shielding as the default economic setting.
Therefore, even when a society accepts the value proposition
offered by mandatory disclosure, implementing a publicly accessible
registry is not necessarily the optimal course of action. Policymakers
concerned about identity shielding could adopt more nuanced
approaches—including databases only accessible to law enforcement
agencies but not the general public—that may capture some of the
benefits of identity shielding while simultaneously attempting to

in Multi-Million Dollar Health Care Fraud and Money Laundering Scheme (Oct. 2, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/shell-company-operator-pleads-guilty-multi-million-dollar-health-carefraud-and-money [https://perma.cc/5A8B-Z8RM].
262. Indeed, as Professor Jeffrey Skopek puts it, “anonymity is never perfect: everything that
we consider to be anonymous will contain some information that eliminates the majority of
individuals in the world from the group of potential sources.” Jeffrey M. Skopek, Anonymity, the
Production of Goods, and Institutional Design, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1751, 1758 (2014).
263. See Scott D. Michel, Zhanna A. Ziering & Young Ran Kim, U.S. Offshore Account
Enforcement Issues, 16 J. TAX PRAC. PROC. 49, 65–66 (2014).
264. See Steven A. Dean, The Incomplete Global Market for Tax Information, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 605, 619 (2008) (“U.S. tax authorities require a wide range of individuals and entities to
report an array of payments, transactions, and events. In the first instance, individuals,
corporations, estates, and others are obligated to file tax returns describing their own status and
activities each year.” (footnote omitted)); Larry Donahue, Regular LLC Versus Anonymous
LLC, LAW 4 SMALL BUS. P.C. (Oct. 16, 2016), https://www.l4sb.com/blog/regular-llc-versusanonymous-llc [https://perma.cc/CE4U-GPP9] (“Anonymous LLCs are taxed the same as any
other LLCs.”). Anonymity, of course, is not absolute even in a world where no ownership
information is gathered through a dedicated government registry. For instance, an LLC or a
corporation could be subpoenaed, which could expose personal information during litigation. See
Meera Unnithan Sossamon, Subpoenas and Social Networks: Fixing the Stored Communications
Act in a Civil Litigation Context, 57 LOY. L. REV. 619, 623 (2011).
265. See Natalie Ram, Genetic Privacy After Carpenter, 105 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1377–78
(2019); Margaret B. Kwoka, Leaking and Legitimacy, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1387, 1410–11
(2015); Daniel L. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75
S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084–85 (2002).
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minimize the harms inflicted by anonymous shell companies. This
approach can be conceptualized as a “semi-disclosure” regime,266
enabling societies to harness the upsides of identity shielding without
necessarily giving up government registries that can aid investigative
efforts curtailing tax evasion and other financial crimes.
To a certain extent, this is the approach currently embraced by the
U.S. federal government under the CTA. The CTA requires the U.S.
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to “maintain the
reported beneficial ownership information in a confidential, secure,
and non-public database” only to be disclosed for “specific purposes to
several categories of recipients, such as federal law enforcement.”267 Of
course, semi-disclosure regimes still suffer from the baseline question
of whether mandates would induce financial criminals to self-report in
the first place. While open questions remain as to the efficacy of this
type of disclosure regime as well, semi-disclosure regimes are more
favorable than public registries, at least if identity shielding is worth
preserving.
In this regard, it is critical for policymakers to recognize that
identity shielding is particularly valuable to individuals who are
vulnerable to threats, harassment, and discrimination due to their
personal circumstances—as is the case for survivors of intimate partner
violence. To these individuals, anonymity serves as an entrepreneurial
safehouse to secure financial freedom in a world where traditional
employment is difficult if not deadly to achieve. For others, including
Black entrepreneurs who conceal their race through anonymous
companies,268 a simple ban on identity shielding compromises their
266. This Article borrows the term “semi-disclosure” from legal scholars who have proposed
limited disclosures in the context of campaign finance law. See Bruce Cain, Shade from the Glare:
The Case for Semi-Disclosure, CATO UNBOUND (Nov. 8, 2010, 11:08 AM), http://www.catounbound.org/2010/11/08/bruce-cain/shade-from-the-glare-the-case-for-semi-disclosure [https://perma.cc/
8UGJ-PBBN]; see also Gilbert, supra note 91, at 1878 (“Under semi-disclosure, much or all of the
information mentioned above would be reported to the government. That would help ensure
compliance with contribution limits and police corruption. Only some of that information,
however, would be publicly disclosed, and it may be disclosed in a different form.”).
267. Press Release, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, FinCEN Launches Regulatory
Process for New Beneficial Ownership Reporting Requirement (Apr. 1, 2021), https://
www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-launches-regulatory-process-new-beneficial-ownersh
ip-reporting [https://perma.cc/LXJ8-F4DG].
268. See supra Section II.B. Similarly, many transgender business owners “don’t openly
identify as trans because they are afraid to do so.” Jane K. Callahan, How Entrepreneurship Is
Helping the Transgender Community, HIGH TOUCH (Aug. 12, 2020), https://hightouch.co/howentrepreneurship-is-helping-the-transgender-community [https://perma.cc/K77H-WWRM].
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ability to compete more equitably in a biased and prejudiced
marketplace.269 Legal scholars have praised limited liability’s promise
in widening participation in the marketplace and equalizing
opportunities to gain wealth, since entrepreneurs need not fear losing
more than the capital they invested.270 Perhaps more directly, identity
shielding can unlock opportunities to gain wealth for individuals who
are socially marginalized by society and unfairly discriminated against
by the marketplace.271
Disclosure laws also do not merely impact those directly subject
to disclosure mandates. Indeed, there are subtle but powerful
consequences of coerced disclosures even from the public’s standpoint.
Recall that anonymous companies encourage entrepreneurial risktaking and human collaboration by protecting the identity of capital
contributors. Assurance of anonymity, importantly, helps incubate
businesses that are not purely driven by profit motives, as was the case
for launching mifepristone in the United States.272 In many cases, it is
the line of business perceived to promote particular political agendas—
269. For this reason, a simple ban on identity shielding would create costs borne
disproportionately by women and other socially marginalized groups. For a myriad of reasons,
women are especially vulnerable on the internet, suffering abusive language, sexual harassment,
and cyber-stalking, and they are also vulnerable to real-life stalking and violence. See Anita Allen,
Gender and Privacy in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2000) (explaining that women
are viewed as inferior and safe targets for harassment and abuse online). As Professor Danielle
Citron explains in her celebrated work, online harassment of women “impedes women’s full
participation in online life, often driving them offline, and undermines their autonomy, identity,
dignity, and well-being.” Danielle K. Citron, Law’s Expressive Value in Combating Cyber Gender
Harassment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 373, 373 (2009). Concerns about internet privacy and safety often
cause reluctance in female business owners who wish to engage in e-business or social networking
to boost their business engagement or product sales. See Alexandra Michota, Digital Security
Concerns and Threats Facing Female Entrepreneurs, 2 J. INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1,
2 (2013); see also Ann M. Lipton, Capital Discrimination, HOUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 105) (on file with author) (critiquing how business law doctrines fail to recognize
“how discrimination can undermine women’s ability to participate in business as principals”).
270. See Presser, supra note 126, at 148.
271. Indeed, legal scholars have highlighted the promise of business entities in disrupting
inequalities. Metaphorically importing the laws of business associations to the regulation of
intimate relationships, Professor Martha Ertman observes that “[b]usiness models are relatively
free of the antiquated notions of status, morality, and biological relation” that plague other areas
of the law. Martha M. Ertman, The Business of Intimacy: Bridging the Private-Private Distinction,
in FEMINISM CONFRONTS HOMO ECONOMICUS: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY 467, 468 (Martha
Albertson Fineman & Terence Dougherty eds., 2005).
272. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Drug’s U.S. Marketer Remains Elusive, WASH. POST, Oct. 12,
2000, at A18 (explaining how efforts to launch the first abortion drug in the United States was
“not driven by the profit motive” but rather driven by a “chance to offer to American women a
real new option, something that has been denied to them for political reasons for 15 years”).
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like reproductive healthcare or firearm sales—that subjects those
involved in the enterprise to threats, bullying, and harassment. In this
sense, a system of coerced public disclosure chills the ability of
individuals to establish and maintain business enterprises that advance
certain political views.273 Without anonymity, the range of enterprises
funded is severely diminished, and the types of enterprises funded are
less of a byproduct of our own agency but mandates of societal
orthodoxy.
This has important implications from a democratic governance
perspective.274 In the United States, for instance, it is settled law that
the right to privacy affords constitutional protection for women’s
decision whether to end a pregnancy.275 But such rights can be
exercised effectively only to the extent that the commercial
marketplace supplies the necessary products and services to effectuate
those rights.276 In this sense, incubating morally contestable enterprises
can serve broader goals of safeguarding fundamental constitutional
rights, not just as a theoretical matter, but as a practical one.
Separate from funding morally contentious enterprises, there are
vast swaths of enterprises that would otherwise not exist without some

273. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that
“immunity from state scrutiny of membership lists which the Association claims on behalf of its
members is here so related to the right of the members to pursue their lawful private interests
privately and to associate freely with others . . . as to come within the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
274. As outlined by Scott Skinner-Thompson,
Democratic theory and Supreme Court jurisprudence have long recognized that
privacy and anonymity serve as critical first-order rights that help make the freedom to
associate, organize, and speak meaningful. . . . [J]ust as privacy can, as discussed above,
serve a critical role in the creation of individual identity, it can also help develop
collective or group identities.
SCOTT SKINNER-THOMPSON, PRIVACY AT THE MARGINS 51–53 (2021); see also Cohen, supra
note 29, at 1905 (“[F]reedom from surveillance, whether public or private, is foundational to the
practice of informed and reflective citizenship. Privacy therefore is an indispensable structural
feature of liberal democratic political systems.”).
275. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); see also Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
991, 991 (“[E]ven if Roe is reversed, constitutional principles of equal protection constrain
government regulation of abortion.”).
276. Cf. Calo, supra note 81, at 651 (“Privacy is best understood as an instrument of human
flourishing. To flourish, people need the separation from others that privacy affords. But they
also need access to the material and cultural resources that only other people in society can
provide.” (footnote omitted)).
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assurance of anonymity for capital contributors.277 The magnitude of
identity shielding’s importance in encouraging business enterprises is
an empirical question that should be further examined in future
scholarship.
*

*

*

In many respects, the tradeoffs that exist in the laws of business
entities parallel tensions that animate other areas of the law. In election
law, mandatory disclosures of campaign finance contributions expose
the sources of speech that can help some voters “assess candidates and
issues and vote more competently.”278 But as Professor Michael Gilbert
explains, disclosure also imposes “costs on speech, and that . . . means
fewer speech acts will take place, fewer ideas will circulate, and voters
will receive less information.”279 In trust law, it is evident that trusts
enabling the transmission of wealth without public disclosure invite
exploitation, corruption, and injustice.280 But as Professor Frances
Foster explains, “[t]rust law has placed such a premium on privacy that
it has denied trust beneficiaries as well as the general public access to
the trust instrument.”281 In tax law, scholars have argued that public
disclosures of corporate tax returns “would increase detection of illegal
tax evasion, result in shaming of unethical corporate behavior, catalyze
beneficial policy changes, and generally increase the public’s
277. Anonymity also ensures that one’s investment in promising ventures is not exploited by
competitors or other investors. This principle, of course, is already recognized in the laws
governing investments in American public companies. That is, there is no duty for the average
retail investor to disclose her ownership of stocks. See Bebchuk & Jackson, Jr., supra note 206
(“[T]he general rule [is] that investors in public companies may remain anonymous.”). As
explained by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson, Jr., a mandatory disclosure
requirement “might enable other investors to free-ride on . . . investments in information
acquisition about under-valued companies and thus could have an adverse effect on such
investments.” Id. at 43.
278. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 1862; see also Press Release, White House, Statement by the
President on the DISCLOSE Act (Apr. 29, 2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/statement-president-disclose-act [https://perma.cc/585Q-G5EC] (proponents of
disclosure assess that disclosure enable the public to “follow the money and see clearly which
special interests are funding political campaign activity and trying to buy representation”).
279. Gilbert, supra note 91, at 1862. It is for this reason that Professors Ian Ayres and Jeremy
Bulo argue that “mandating anonymous donations can make it more difficult for candidates to
sell access or influence.” Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor
Anonymity To Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 837 (1998).
280. Foster, supra note 138, at 558.
281. Id. at 566.
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understanding of tax law.”282 Yet the Internal Revenue Service is
prohibited from releasing tax returns publicly as a matter of statutory
law,283 in part driven by the recognition that such disclosure measures
would “lead to information overload rather than enlightenment, and
expose proprietary information, which could diminish corporations’
willingness to cooperate with the IRS.”284 The list goes on. The point is
not that privacy needs to be pursued at all costs, but rather to recognize
the true cost of enterprise transparency.
With the looming policy debate over the specific design of
ownership disclosure laws, it is worth remembering that there are
important societal benefits of identity shielding—even if they may be
hard to detect or measure. Those who consider unfettered
transparency as the panacea may risk much more than what they had
initially envisioned.
CONCLUSION
Anonymous companies have become a staple feature of modern
economic life by enabling individuals to operate business enterprises
without coerced public disclosure. While not without costs, identity
shielding advances a broad spectrum of economic and humanistic
interests. These interests include the desire to incubate enterprises that
are not purely driven by profit motives but also to advance political or
moral viewpoints. In other cases, identity shielding ensures the physical
safety of those involved in business ventures. And yet for others,
anonymity enables entrepreneurs to compete on more equal footing in
the commercial marketplace, countering the prejudice and
discrimination experienced by socially marginalized groups.
Modern business entities today thus function not only to facilitate
business enterprises under familiar academic banners of limited

282. Daniel Schaffa, The Economic Efficiency Case Against Business Tax Privacy, 50 SETON
HALL L. REV. 27, 29–30 (2020) (footnotes omitted). Moreover, because firms today have an
incentive to “exaggerate their income reported to shareholders and to understate their income
for tax purposes,” Professors Lawrence Summers and Natasha Sarin argue that “tax transparency
will lead to accountability and ultimately wiser policy.” Lawrence Summers & Natasha Sarin,
Opinion, Many Companies Pay Nothing in Taxes. The Public Has a Right to Know How They Pull
It Off, WASH. POST (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/10/22/manycompanies-pay-nothing-taxes-public-has-right-know-how-they-pull-it-off [https://perma.cc/2EU6UF6J].
283. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a), (b)(2), (c).
284. Joshua D. Blank, Reconsidering Corporate Tax Privacy, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 31, 36
(2014).
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liability and entity shielding, but also to serve as powerful instruments
of privacy. Understanding the privacy function of modern business
entities provides a fresh outlook on balancing the interests advanced
by anonymity with the societal need to curb illicit activities propagated
by anonymous shell companies. This analysis comes at an opportune
time, as new statutes are being enacted across the world requiring
business ownership disclosures. These reform efforts almost invariably
derive from the understandable impulse to romanticize transparency.
And it almost seems like the natural order of things that more
information ought to produce better markets and societies.
But a sober examination reveals the important and unexamined
virtues of enterprise anonymity that already constitute an important
lifeblood of the modern economy. By developing a theoretical account
of identity shielding, this Article hopes to encourage policymakers to
engage in a more nuanced discussion of regulating and harnessing
anonymity. It also hopes the discussion helps pave a path to reimagine
business entities not just as transaction-cost-reducing economic
devices, but also as instruments of privacy that can advance important
societal interests.

